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ABSTRACT 
 
Essay 1 tests the ability of a commercial structural credit default swap pricing model to 
predict market spreads.  Consistent with several previous studies testing other models, we 
find our model unable to price credit risk precisely and observe an illiquidity premium 
reflecting a credit risk component which should be incorporated into future pricing 
models.  We also identify macroeconomic and stock market factors that help explain 
movements in CDS spreads beyond the levels suggested by the model.   
 
Essay 2 looks at bid and ask spreads to find evidence of quote shading where dealers 
manipulate their quotes in order to attract sell orders.  This is something not yet studied in 
CDS literature and we draw on studies on the foreign exchange markets for theoretical 
support.  We find that dealers are more likely to indulge in quote shading when firm risk 
increases but not close to weekends or holidays.  We also look at price discovery with 
and without quote shading but our results are inconclusive.  Using the put-call ratio as a 
risk level indicator, we find that price discovery in the CDS market decreases as firm risk 
increases.  
 
Essay 3 looks at the quality of the CDS market in the backdrop of the recent financial 
crisis.  Previous studies have found that CDS markets lead price discovery only in the 
case of high risk firms and this paper tests if price discovery dynamics have shifted in 
favour of the CDS market since overall firm risk levels have increased.  Using Granger-
causality tests, we compare stock and CDS markets before and since the crisis and finds 
that despite an overall increase in risk levels, the stock market continues to lead the CDS 
market in all risk categories.  We also test the CDS market for mis-reaction using 
Variance Ratios and find that while there was evidence of over-reaction before the crisis, 
CDS market is under-reacting since the crisis. 
 
 
Key Words: Credit Default Swaps, CreditGrades, CDS Implied Volatility, Liquidity, 
Price Discovery, Quote Shading, Day-of-Week Effect, Post-Crisis 
Analysis, Over-reaction, Under-reaction. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“…But if the economy keeps slowing, credit default swaps, like subprime mortgages, 
may become a household term.  Credit default swaps form a large but obscure market that 
will be put to its first big test as a looming economic downturn strains companies’ 
finances.” 
      New York Times, February 17, 2008
1
 
 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are derivative instruments that allow investors protection 
against credit events like downgrades of or defaults by single-name or a basket of 
obligors.  Estimated by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) to be at $32.6 tln in 
Dec 2009
2
, these instruments represent one of the largest and fastest growing financial 
product markets globally, making the comments expressed in the New York Times a 
cause for concern.   
The need to develop a better understanding of these instruments and their associated risks 
has gained significance in the backdrop of the global financial crisis that started with the 
subprime mortgage problems in 2007.  From an academic perspective, a significant 
amount of research in this area has focused on the development of models to price risk 
and the focus has recently shifted to empirical research.   
Given that our understanding of the “over-the-counter” (OTC) market for CDS is still in 
the nascent stages, my dissertation examines the CDS market to understand the behaviour 
of   participants and market dynamics.  As a result, all three chapters in this document 
                                                 
1 “Arcane Market Is Next to Face Big Credit Test”, Morgenson, Gretchen; 
2008, February 12. New York Times. 
 
2
 http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf 
2 
look at issues that are at the heart of the ongoing discussion on CDS, ranging from the 
accuracy of pricing models to market informational efficiency and quality.  We examine 
the following: 
1. Performance of a commercial structural CDS pricing model. 
2. Dealer quotes and their impact on informational efficiency of the CDS market. 
3. The CDS market quality in the backdrop of the financial crisis.  
 
1.1 Beyond Structural Models 
One of the issues to emerge from the financial crisis was the inability of the models to 
explain market spreads.  Without a commonly accepted pricing model, trading 
institutions typically use internally developed, proprietary models that are not available to 
the public for review.  However, most of these models build upon either structural or 
reduced-form theoretical models which have been the focus of academic research for 
some time.   
Ericsson et al (2005) test some of the popular theoretical models – by Leland, Leland-
Toft and Fan-Sundaresan – to find that the Leland and Fan-Sundaresan models, on 
average, underestimate actual CDS spreads by 50 and 33 bps respectively while the 
Leland-Toft model, on average, overestimates market CDS spreads by 8 bps.  Eom et al 
(2004) also test models to find that they fail to price market CDS spreads precisely.  
Given these studies and other papers with similar findings, we find that pricing models 
only provide a benchmark price and are unable to price spreads accurately.   
3 
Our paper tests CreditGrades, a commercially available CDS pricing model, against 
market CDS spreads.  In case of any evident mispricing, we identify factors that improve 
the accuracy of the spreads so that these risk factors can be integrated into future pricing 
models. 
Consistent with findings of studies testing other models, we find CreditGrades unable to 
price credit risk accurately.  We find evidence of an illiquidity premium in the CDS 
market which contradicts arguments from previous studies.  We believe that this reflects 
credit risk and is a component missing from existing pricing models which should be 
incorporated into the pricing dynamics.  We also identify macroeconomic and stock 
market factors that help explain movements in CDS spreads beyond the levels suggested 
by the model.  Although including these factors significantly improves the fit of the 
pricing model, we find a large part of the spread changes remains unexplained suggesting 
risk factors that are still being omitted by our model and possibly, the market as well. 
    
1.2 Dealer Quotes and Their Impact on Price Discovery 
Given the CDS market’s OTC structure and limited data availability, there is little 
research studying how dealers manage their open positions.  We draw from literature on 
the foreign exchange market, which is also OTC, to understand how dealers manage their 
inventory through “quote shading”.  This concept was first introduced by  Garman (1976) 
and then developed further by Amihud and Mendelson (1980) who built a multi-period 
model where dealers increase prices if their inventory is shrinking and reduce prices in 
case of an inventory decline.   
4 
Using bid and ask spreads, we look for evidence of “quote shading” in the CDS market as 
dealers adjust quotes to encourage counterparties to buy or sell CDS, allowing them to 
close out open positions. 
We find evidence of quote shading in around 10% of the data.  We recognize that it is 
also possible for dealers to cover their open short positions at prevailing market ask 
spreads as quote shading could reveal important information about their positions.  We 
find that dealers are more likely to carry out quote shading when the firm is going 
through a high risk period.  
More importantly, we test the impact this practice has on the informational efficiency in 
the CDS market.  Using Hasbrouck’s informational share measure, we find that price 
discovery in the CDS market is slower when the firm risk is high, implying that quote 
shading may come at a cost of reduced informational efficiency in the CDS market. 
1.3 Market Quality and the Financial Crisis 
CDS and stocks offer the chance to study two different markets for the same underlying 
asset but with different price discovery dynamics.   While the stock market has a 
relatively large number of retail investors, the less liquid CDS market consists primarily 
of banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions which may be considered relatively 
well informed compared to retail investors in the stock market.   
Blanco et al. (2005) examine the CDS and bond markets to conclude that there is greater 
price discovery in the CDS markets than in the bond markets.  Forte and Pena (2009) find 
the stock market leading CDS and both CDS and shares leading the bond market.  While 
5 
it is generally accepted that the bond market lags CDS and stocks, research reflects mixed 
results when comparing the CDS and the stock markets.   
Forte and Lovreta (2008) look at the stock and CDS markets for the period 2002-2004 to 
find CDS spreads leading price discovery for the higher risk (lower rated) credits 
supporting findings from Acharya and Johnson (2007).  More importantly, they also find 
evidence suggesting the informational dominance of the stock market declining over the 
period 2002-2004. 
We add to literature by extending the analysis to include the financial crisis and any 
impact it may have had on the price discovery process.  Using Variance Ratios developed 
by Lo and MacKinlay (1988), we also look for any evidence of mis-reaction in the CDS 
market before and since the crisis. 
We find that contrary to our expectations, the stock market continues to lead the CDS 
market across all risk categories.  Interestingly, we also find that while the CDS market 
was characterized by over-reaction in the pre-crisis period, the market is now under-
reacting in a less liquid environment contradicting Cox and Peterson (1994) findings 
where markets over-react in tighter liquidity conditions.    
6 
References 
Acharya, V. & T. Johnson (2007). "Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives." Journal of 
Financial Economics, 84(1): 110-141. 
 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., (1980). “Dealership Market: Market Making with 
Inventory.” Journal of Financial Economics 8:31–53. 
 
Blanco, R., S.Brennan, et al. (2005). “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation 
between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Finance 
60(5): 2255-2281. 
 
Cox, D. and D. Peterson (1994).”Stock Returns Following Large One-Day Declines: 
Evidence on Short-Term Reversals and Longer-Term Performance.” Journal of 
Finance, 49(1): 255-267. 
 
Eom, Y. H., J. Helwege, et al. (2004). "Structural Models of Corporate Bond Pricing: An 
Empirical Analysis." Review of Financial Studies 17(2): 499-544. 
 
Ericsson, J., J. Reneby, et al. (2005). Can Structural Models Price Default Risk? Evidence 
from Bond and Credit Derivative Markets, Working paper, McGill University. 
 
Forte, S and J.I. Pena (2009). “Credit spreads: An empirical analysis on the informational 
content  of stocks, bonds, and CDS.” Journal of Banking & Finance 33(11): 2013-
2025. 
 
Forte, S and L.Lovretta (2008). Credit Risk Discovery in the Stock and CDS Markets:  
 Who Leads, When, and Why. Working paper, ESADE Business School. 
 
Garman, M. (1976). “Market microstructure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3:257-275. 
 
Lo, A. and C. MacKinlay (1988). “Stock Market Prices do not Follow Random Walks: 
Evidence from a Simple Specification Test.” Review of Financial Studies  1(1): 41-
66. 
  
7 
Chapter 2. Beyond Structural Models 
 
“Credit swaps are very hard to price. The easiest and most common way to 
determine price is the market pricing approach. "If the bond market is 
pricing 10-year Italy at Libor+25 basis points (bp) then, regardless of any 
internal pricing model telling you the swap premium should be 40bp, you 
have to price the swap at 25bp," says Lincoln Benet, head of credit 
derivatives at Morgan Stanley in London.”  
      Euromoney, Mar 1996
3
 
 
 
“John Mauldin, another influential investor, thinks counterparty risk in 
CDS will be one of the big stories in 2008, particularly as already-fragile 
bond insurers are big in that market.” 
     The Economist, January 12, 2008
4
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) represent one of the largest and fastest growing financial 
product markets globally.  The size and growth of this market make the Euromoney 
comments a cause for concern.  The practitioner view of model mispricing is confirmed 
by academic literature testing the relationship between theoretical and market spreads.  
Ericsson et al (2005) test some of the popular theoretical models – by Leland, Leland-
Toft and Fan-Sundaresan – to find that the Leland and Fan-Sundaresan models, on 
average, underestimate actual CDS spreads by 50 and 33 bps respectively while the 
Leland-Toft model overestimates market CDS spreads by 8 bps on average.  Eom et al 
(2004) also tests models to find that they fail to price market CDS spreads precisely.  
                                                 
3
 “But how do you price them?”, Parsley, Mark. Mar 1996, Euromoney, Iss. 323;  pg. 30 
 
4
 “Finance And Economics: Stepping beyond subprime; Banks and the credit 
crunch.”, 2008, January. The Economist, 386(8562), 66. 
 
8 
Given these and other studies with similar findings, we see that theoretical pricing models 
only provide a benchmark price and are unable to price spreads accurately.   
The goal of this paper is to test a commercial CDS pricing model against market CDS 
spreads.  In case of mispricing, we identify factors that help improve the accuracy of the 
model spreads so that these risk factors can be integrated into future pricing models. 
Complicating our ability to price these assets using our existing models is the influence 
of different types of financial risk.  Unlike for the bond market, Longstaff et al (2005) 
argue that liquidity does not need to be priced in the CDS market.  They state that it does 
not play a part in driving CDS spreads as the swaps are synthetic and can be issued by 
any market participant willing to trade at the prevailing prices.  However, as indicated in 
the earlier quote, counter-party and credit risk may influence the price in ways that are 
not currently incorporated in our models.  According to the Economist, the ability of the 
“already-fragile bond insurers” to sell credit risk with limited disclosure requirements has 
resulted in uncertainty about the quality of counterparty risk.  As some of the heavily 
leveraged hedge funds are major sellers of insurance in the CDS market, regulators are 
concerned about their ability to honour obligations in case of an unravelling of the credit 
chain.  The degree to which different types of financial risk influence the observed prices 
is an empirical question which we consider even though these types of risk are not 
formally included in our model.  
   
In the backdrop of the sub-prime crisis, it is of vital importance that the market accurately 
estimates default probabilities, thus pricing credit risk correctly.  According to Darrell 
9 
Duffie, “…this is one area of finance where our ability to structure financial products 
may be running ahead of our understanding of the implications”5.  In the absence of a 
single dominant pricing model, the majority of literature on CDS has focused on credit 
risk modeling and it is only recently that focus has shifted to empirical studies of the CDS 
market.   
In this paper, we use the Dow-30 firms to test the credit default spreads derived from the 
CreditGrades model (Finger, 2001) developed by the RiskMetrics Group and find that the 
model, on average, underprices credit by 10 bps.  Given that the 10 bps may represent 
noise, we conduct a further test using volatility implied by the CDS model based on 
market prices.  Using Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) as a basis for comparison, we test 
the Equity Options Implied Volatility (EOIV) and CDS Implied Volatility (CDSIV) 
against realized volatility to find higher error levels for CDSIV.  This confirms that the 
EOIV is a better predictor of volatility especially in the shorter term and supports the 
need for incorporating additional risk factors into the CDS pricing model.   
Confirming that our model misprices CDS spreads, we draw on Tang and Yan (2007) and 
Collin-Dufresne et al (2001) to use liquidity and macroeconomic variables as risk factors 
in a regression model to explain the mispricing.  Using macroeconomic factors as a proxy 
for risk, we find that they improve the fit of the model suggesting that the CreditGrades 
model suffers from omitted economic risk factors and is therefore unable to reflect credit 
risk accurately.  Additionally, we find that the buyers in the CDS market pay an 
                                                 
5
 “Irresistible Reasons For Better Models of Credit Risk”,  Darrell Duffie, Financial Times. London (UK), 
Apr 16, 2004. pg. 17 
10 
illiquidity premium which contradicts the argument presented by Longstaff et al (2005) 
that unlike bonds, CDS spreads do not reflect a liquidity premium. 
Our contribution to the literature is the testing of the CreditGrades pricing model to find 
that, on average, it underprices market CDS spreads by 10 bps.  We also identify stock 
index volatility and risk premium as risk factors that should be incorporated in future 
pricing models to reduce the level of mispricing.  More importantly, contrary to previous 
studies, we argue that liquidity is a measure of risk that should be included into the 
pricing models and show this factor to be empirically significant.  However, with a low 
adjusted R-square and a statistically significant regression constant, we recognize that 
there are still factors that need to be identified and built into the theoretical pricing 
models. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces 
credit default swaps, the different pricing models, our choice of model and review of 
research on factors explaining credit spreads.  Section 2.3 looks at the data set and the 
expected relationship between our variables and credit spreads.  We test the performance 
of our model in Section 2.4.  In Section 2.5 we examine some of the omitted risk factors 
that may help explain CDS spread movements and present our test results with our 
conclusion in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2. Credit Default Swaps 
Prior to the emergence of credit derivatives in the 1990s, the task of managing credit risk 
was limited to the use of traditional financial analysis, covenants and counterparty limits.  
11 
These measures were typically undertaken by financial institutions or large investors and 
included the use of triggers & covenants, collateral and regular business review. 
However, the high demand for structured solutions in the field of credit risk management 
led to the introduction of credit risk instruments like CDS, developed on the basis of 
complex statistical models.  According to ISDA estimates
6
, the outstanding notional 
amount of CDS in June 2006 was US$ 26 trillion as compared to only US$6.4 trillion for 
equity derivatives.  Despite the financial crisis and the resulting slowdown, the CDS 
market was sized at $32.6 tln in Dec 2009
7
.  With plans of taking CDS from the OTC 
market to an exchange based setting, these numbers are expected to show higher growth 
going forward and it is important to understand how these instruments are priced. 
The CDS works as insurance on debt that an investor (buyer of protection) can purchase 
from the market (Figure 2.1).  Therefore, similar to the insurance mechanism, the investor 
is required to make regular premium payments (quoted in bppa) to the counterparty 
(seller of protection) and in case of a defined credit event, either a downgrade or a default 
of a third party (reference entity), the insurer gets a physical or cash settlement on the 
exposure.  In the case of physical settlement, the buyer surrenders the underlying asset 
(bond etc.) to the seller and receives the full and final settlement in return.  If the 
settlement basis is cash, the buyer gets to keep the asset and only receives the difference 
between the face value and the recovery (or prevailing market) value as settlement. 
 
                                                 
6
 “Summaries of Recent Survey Results”, http:///www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html 
 
7
 http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf 
12 
Figure 2.1 CDS Transaction Structure 
2.2.1 Pricing Models 
Our discussion with a major CDS trading institution confirmed that while some CDS 
pricing models may be more commonly used than others, there is currently no single 
pricing model that can be considered the primary pricing tool for the market.  Given the 
absence of a dominant pricing tool, an investor may be quoted different prices for the 
same contract by two different banks, both using their proprietary models.   
To understand the reasons for the lack of a uniform pricing tool, it is important to 
highlight two of the key inputs that are needed for pricing credit risk; the time to default 
and the subsequent recovery rate.  A credit event is not limited to default and may include 
rating downgrades as well.  It is therefore important to accurately forecast the evolution 
of the credit risk, a task that is very difficult to model.  Additionally, it is important to be 
able to estimate the recovery rates for the loans.  While there are ways to arrive at 
estimates for both these inputs, they are based on historical data and therefore include 
proprietary data unique to each firm and its experiences.  
 
Underlying 
credit 
exposure 
Quarterly premium payment (x bppa) 
 
Credit event – payment as agreed in 
contract 
No credit event – no payment Protection Buyer Protection Seller 
Reference Asset 
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Most of the valuation models can be grouped into one of the following two categories (or 
a hybrid): 
1) Structural models  
2) Reduced form models 
The main difference between the two models is that structural models base default on the 
firm’s asset-liability evolution process and reduced form models assume that default is a 
stochastic event independent of the firm’s financial position, dependent on the general 
level of interest rates. 
 
2.2.2 Structural Models 
These are characterized by modeling of a firm’s total value in order to develop an 
estimate for the probability of default.  According to these models, the source of credit 
risk is the uncertainty concerning the market value of the firm and they build upon 
Merton’s model (1974) for valuing risky debt.   
For our study, we use a structural model and therefore only present a general overview 
here with the detailed mathematical model presented in Appendix 2A and 2B. 
The underlying Merton (1974) model is built on insights from the Black-Scholes (1973) 
options pricing model using the following premise: 
1) Default events are predictable based on the value of debt and the value of the 
firm. 
2) The value of the assets of the firm evolves randomly. 
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A firm with debt and equity in its capital structure will pay the bondholders, on maturity, 
the lower of the face value of debt or the market value of the firm, the latter case 
representing a default scenario.  In other words, if the market value of the firm is greater 
than the face value of debt, the bondholders get their debt repaid and the residual value 
flows to the equity holders.  On the other hand, if the market value of the firm is less than 
the face value of debt, the bondholders take over the firm thereby getting the market 
value of the firm with the equity holders getting nothing.    
Using the following notation, we can replicate the position of the equity holders and the 
bond holders through options. 
A – Market Value of firm 
S – Market Value of equity 
B – Market Value of debt  
F – Face Value of debt (on maturity, T) 
Where A = B + S 
Table 2.1 shows the payoffs to the respective investor groups: 
 Equity Holders receive Bond Holders receive 
If AT > F AT – F F 
If AT < F 0 AT 
Net Position Max (0, AT – F) Min (F, AT) 
Table 2.1 Payoff to Bond and Equity Investors in a Firm 
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From the above payoffs, we can see that the position of the equity holders is similar to 
holding a call option with the underlying asset being the firm itself.  Using this with the 
put-call parity where C = P + S – Xe-rT, we can draw an analogous relationship with the 
call option being the market value of stock and the underlying asset being the firm.  As a 
result, we get 
S = P + A – Fe-rT 
Substituting for S in the above equation, we get the following result: 
A – B = P + A – Fe-rT 
B = Fe
-rT
 – P 
Therefore, the defaultable bond is equivalent to holding a risk free bond with a short put 
position on the assets of the firm.  Merton uses this relationship to arrive at a value for the 
risky debt.  The yield on the risky debt, when deducted from the yield from a matching 
term risk-free instrument represents the credit spread since it is the return that an investor 
requires for taking on the additional risk.   
While Merton’s paper is groundbreaking in the area of pricing defaultable debt, it suffers 
from two major limitations in the model.  Firstly, it only allows for a default to occur 
upon maturity of debt.  We know that in the real world, default or credit events can 
happen at any time during the life of a loan.  Additionally, one of the inputs in the model 
is the market value of the firm.  This is again difficult to estimate especially if the firm 
has privately placed debt and may therefore lead to valuation errors in the pricing 
process.  Another limitation in the model is that it case of multiple class debt, it requires 
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absolute priority of settlement to be maintained in case of a default which may not 
necessarily be the case especially in case of debt secured through multi-tiered security 
structure.  
Subsequent structural models developed have tried to relax some of the assumptions 
underlying Merton’s model especially the limitation that default may occur only at 
maturity.  Black and Cox (1976) first developed a model that allows for default to occur 
as soon as the firm value falls below a threshold level during the term of the loan.  
However, their model assumes a constant interest rate and also does not address issues 
regarding the seniority of debt and its subsequent impact on recovery rates.  In their 
paper, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) present a model that builds on Black and Cox’s 
model and addresses these two key issues from that model.    
Despite improvements on Merton’s model, critics of structural models argue that these 
models require data on parameters related to the firm’s value and these may be difficult to 
estimate.  Additionally, not all defaults occur from a gradual deterioration in credit 
quality.  Often surprise events force a firm to file for bankruptcy and these are difficult to 
capture through the structural models.   
2.2.3 Reduced-Form Models 
Limitations to the structural models led to the development of another line of pricing 
models that do not condition credit events on the value of the firm and related parameters. 
However, as with other arbitrage based models, reduced form models are best suited for 
highly liquid assets and may not be as accurate in case of low market liquidity.   
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Unlike in a structural model where the evolution of credit may help identify possible 
default, with a reduced-form model, the default event is stochastic with the probability of 
default linked to variations in the level of interest rates.  While a lot of research has 
focused on developing these models, we limit ourselves to structural models in our paper.   
2.2.4 Choice of Model 
Both forms of models have their strengths and weaknesses and the choice often depends 
on the intended use and methodological preference of the user.  For example, in order to 
study the changes in cost of capital due to a change in the capital structure, a structural 
model should be used.    
With regards to the methodology involved, fixed income modellers may have a 
preference for reduced-form models while equity focused researchers may prefer a firm 
value based structural model.   
2.2.5 CreditGrades 
For the purpose of our study, we use the CreditGrades credit default swap (CDS) pricing 
model designed by the RiskMetrics Group (Finger, 2001).  Our choice of model is based 
on the following: 
1) We prefer using a structural model over reduced form models given that Arora et 
al (2005) compare the two forms of models and find structural models to 
outperform reduced form models in estimating CDS levels.  Additionally, these 
models use firm volatility which has been found to be important in determining 
CDS spreads (Consigli, 2004). 
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2) As CreditGrades is a commercially available CDS pricing model that allows 
investors to go online and use it as a CDS calculator, it is likely to reflect market 
beliefs better than the non-commercial models.  Although statistics about market 
usage of this model are not available, Currie and Morris (2002) state that the 
model is commonly used by practitioners.   
3) CreditGrades model has been developed by four leading institutions in the area of 
risk modeling, namely JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and 
RiskMetrics Group.   
4) We prefer CreditGrades over other commercially used CDS pricing models as this 
is the only one, to our knowledge, with modeling details in the public domain.  
Most other commercially used models are proprietary and cannot therefore be 
replicated for the purpose of our study. 
2.2.6 Credit Spreads and Market Risk Variables 
Research finds that theoretical model spreads differ from market spreads – Ericsson et al 
(2005) and Eom et al (2004) .  This could be explained by arguing that models ignore 
variables such as demand and supply interactions or liquidity related factors that affect 
market behaviour.  Alternatively, it could be argued that the use of lagged accounting 
data in the models taken from quarterly or annual announcements may be causing the 
observed gap between theoretical and market spreads.  Bystrom (2006) tests the 
CreditGrades model to find that while there is a correlation between theoretical CDS 
spreads and market CDS spreads, the two spreads often differ prompting the author to 
suggest running a capital arbitrage scheme between the two to generate returns. 
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We therefore turn to factors that have been seen to explain market spreads in an effort to 
improve on the spread estimates derived from the models.  Collin-Dufresne et al (2001) 
look at macroeconomic and financial variables to explain changes in the credit spreads on 
industrial bonds.  Using various firm and market variables to explain changes in credit 
spreads, they find these factors to explain only 25% of the credit spread movements.  
They also find the residuals from the regressions to be correlated pointing to a single 
common factor explaining most of the changes in the credit spreads.  As a result, they 
introduce liquidity and macroeconomic factors but are unable to identify any variable as 
the common factor.  
Ang and Piazzesi (2003) also introduce macroeconomic factors in a pricing kernel to 
explain movements in bond prices and find that these factors explain around 60% to 85% 
of the changes in bond yields.  Amato and Luisi (WP, 2005) look at bond portfolios and 
regress yields against macroeconomic factors to find that changes in real activity and 
financial conditions are significant.  They measure real activity using the index of help 
wanted ads, the unemployment rate, employment levels and the industrial production 
index.   
Ericsson et al (2005) use macroeconomic and liquidity factors to explain mispricing 
between model and market spreads on bonds and CDS.  They find that macroeconomic 
factors do not improve the fit of the model suggesting that the models price risk 
accurately.  However, they also find that liquidity measures are significant in the case of 
bonds but not with CDS.   
Tang and Yan (2007) also look at the pricing effect of liquidity in the CDS market.  Since 
the CDS market is OTC and liquidity levels are not available, they use various proxy 
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measures to capture the effect of liquidity.  Unlike Ericsson et al, they find evidence of an 
illiquidity premium in the CDS market.  
Looking at some of the macroeconomic risk factors consistently used in previous studies, 
we know that variables like index returns, index volatility, default premium and term 
structure have explained CDS spreads.  Furthermore, a study also suggests that liquidity 
may be priced in CDS spreads.  We therefore select these variables to explain the 
mispricing levels in our analysis. 
2.3. Data  
2.3.1 CDS Spreads 
We use daily CDS mid-spreads on 5-year risk from the Thomson DataStream database 
for the period 1 Jan 2005 to 31 Dec 2006.  Our choice of firms is limited to Dow-30 
names since these represent some of the most liquid CDS contracts and also help us 
overcome certain data availability constraints.  However, we exclude companies that (1) 
do not have CDS spreads reported during the period, or (2) are in the financial sector, or 
(3) have a subsidiary with significant lending exposure.  The reason for excluding 
financial firms is that as the CreditGrades model involves the use of debt in computing 
the spreads, firms in the lending business may not have the true debt level reflected in 
their consolidated accounts.    We are therefore left with 23 firms and we use 5-year CDS 
spreads for senior, unsecured bonds as these are the most liquid swaps in the CDS 
market. 
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2.3.2 Model Parameters 
Share Price and Volatility:  We get daily adjusted closing share prices for the 23 Dow 
firms for the period under review from DataStream.  Stock return volatility is derived 
from the share returns.  We use equity options implied volatility which is taken from 
Bloomberg as the weighted average of the volatilities of the three options closest to the 
at-the-money strike. The Bloomberg implied volatility function, HIVG, uses front month 
options with a minimum of 20 business days to expiration. In the case where the options 
have less than 20 days to expiration, it uses the options in the next available month.  
Risk-Free Rate:  This is taken as the rate on a 5-year government bond from the 
DataStream database. 
Accounting Data:  To arrive at the Debt/Share levels, we use Compustat to compute the 
ratio from quarterly accounting data using a 1-month lag period from the quarter end.   
The ratio, computed as follows, is based on the definition prescribed in the CreditGrades 
Technical Document: 
Debt/Share = Debt / Total Number of Shares, where 
Debt = Financial Debt – Minority Interest, where 
Financial Debt = Short Term Borrowings + Long Term Borrowings + 0.5 * (Other 
Short Term Liabilities + Other Long Term Liabilities)  
Where, Minority Debt < = 50% of Financial Debt 
Total Number of Shares = Common Shares + Preferred Shares, where 
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 Common Shares = Market Capitalization / Common Stock Price 
 Preferred Shares = Preferred Equity / Common Stock Price  
In case of stock splits, we ensure that the stock price and debt per share are consistent 
with pre-split levels to avoid non-credit related jumps in our model CDS spreads. 
2.3.3 Risk Factors 
Liquidity: In the absence of daily trading volume levels, we use the bid-ask spread as a 
proxy for liquidity.  The more liquid CDS will have a narrow bid-ask spread while the 
less liquid instruments will reflect a larger bid-ask spread.  However, to account for 
varying levels of risk in our database, we standardize the bid-ask spread by dividing it by 
the mid-price (average of bid-ask spreads).    In line with Tang and Yan (2007) findings, 
we expect this to be positively related to risk.  Therefore, the bid-ask spreads would 
increase given a higher level of risk. 
Stock Index Measures:  We use the S&P500 index daily return as well as daily volatility 
over a 30-day rolling window to proxy for market based risk.  We expect to see a 
negative relationship between index returns and CDS spread changes as an increase in 
index levels should reflect a reduction in risk.   
An increase in index return volatility shows greater uncertainty in the markets and 
therefore would result in increased credit spreads. 
Macroeconomic Measures: Given that our study looks at daily spread level changes 
while most of the other studies use monthly or quarterly macroeconomic factors, we 
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cannot use some of the measures identified in studies covered in the previous section.  
Instead we use the following as these are available at a daily or weekly frequency: 
1) Business Sentiment:  The Sentiment Survey by the American Assoc of Individual 
Investors is a weekly investor sentiment survey that provides a split of bearish-
neutral-bullish views for the next 6 months e.g. 27 Dec 2007 split was 50-20-30.  
We use the Bull Ratio, defined as %Bull / (%Bulls + %Bears), is used to capture 
the market outlook.   We expect to see an inverse relationship as the greater the 
number of investors expecting positive market developments, the lower is the 
perceived risk level in the market. 
2) 3-M risk free rates:  Das et al (2007) find that the 3-M risk-free rates are 
significant in explaining CDS spread movements.  We decide to include this even 
though our model uses the 5-year swap rates since we expect the short term 
interest rates to capture the immediate economic conditions while the longer term 
rates may reflect a smoothed out view of the future.   As low interest rates are 
usually experienced in downturns, we would expect to see a negative relationship 
between interest rate movements and CDS spread changes. 
3) Risk Premium:  This is defined as the change in the daily difference between the 
ML High Yield Master II Index and the JP Morgan US Govt Bond index.  We 
expect to see CDS spreads to increase with an increase in the risk premium and 
therefore a positive relationship between the two. 
4) Term Structure:  We also use term structure as defined by the difference in yields 
between 1M and 10Y government debt.  Similar to the previous factor, we expect 
to see CDS spreads to increase with an increase in the term premium. 
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We base our tests on the belief that markets are efficient.  As a result, we exclude firm 
specific financial performance indicators since we believe this information would have 
already been incorporated in the stock price. 
2.4. Model Performance 
2.4.1 Mean Error 
Using the daily input data, we run the CreditGrades model on Matlab to derive the 5-year 
CDS spreads suggested by the model. As a test of our program code, we also compare 
our model derived spreads with those derived from the CreditGrades website and find 
them to be the same.  For equity volatility, an input in our model, we use the 1250-day 
historical volatility as this matches the term of our CDS.  We also try using equity options 
implied volatility but find the historical volatility to generate more accurate CDS spreads 
and therefore continue with the historical volatility measure.  This is in line with results 
from the CreditGrades Technical Document (Finger, 2002) that compares equity options 
implied volatility and historical volatility to find the 1000 day historical volatility 
provides the best estimate of actual CDS spreads. 
Figure 2.2 presents a graphical comparison of the model spreads against market spreads 
for the same credit.  It is evident from the graphs that the model overestimates the market 
CDS spreads in some instances and underestimates them at other times.  More 
importantly, we do not see any evidence of consistent under or over pricing except in 
case of the low risk firms where our model consistently generates a very low spread and 
thus appears to underprice the risk.  
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One of the arguments presented to explain the difference between the model and market 
spreads is the use of quarterly accounting data in our model.  Markets, by comparison, are 
much more efficient and therefore, able to price company and market events in real time 
thereby being a possible reason for the model’s failure.  However, as share price, an input 
in the model, has been seen to lead the bond and CDS markets (Norden and Weber, 
2004), such events should be priced into the model spreads through share price changes.  
We note, however, that events may have different implications for equity risk and debt 
risk and therefore, our model may not be able to reflect accounting information changes 
perfectly through stock price movements. 
Table 2.2 presents a snapshot of the key statistics for the market CDS spreads as well as 
our model generated CDS spreads.  We observe that CreditGrades spreads are mostly 
below market levels and the model generates near-zero spreads for the lower risk firms in 
our database.  While standard deviation is at similar levels, as the model CDS spreads are 
considerably below the market ones, it translates into much higher levels of dispersion of 
spreads. 
The Mean Error, the difference between the market CDS spreads and the model CDS 
spreads has typically been used as a performance measure for testing models.  We use 
this measure to find that, on average, our model underprices CDS spreads by 10 bps.  
Table 2.3 presents ours findings for each firm as well as the result for the entire dataset. 
In summary, our comparison between the model derived CDS spreads and the actual 
market CDS spreads shows no clear relationship emerging between the two as there is 
evidence of underpricing as well as overpricing at different points in time.  However, we 
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see that, on average, our model underprices spreads by 10 bps.  This could potentially 
signal that some risk factors are missing from our pricing model that need to be included 
to arrive at more precise spread estimates. 
2.4.2 CDS Model Implied Volatility 
While most of the inputs into the model are observable from the market, we look at some 
of the implied parameter values to test the model and understand the difference between 
the market and theoretical spreads.  These input parameters could either relate to the 
equity volatility, as we use the historical volatility as a proxy for future volatility, or to 
the recovery rates.  Our objective is to extract one of the implied values from the model 
and match it against the realized value as a further test of our model. 
In the absence of defaults and subsequent recoveries, it is not viable to extract the 
recovery rates as we would not have a metric to test it against.  However, we note that as 
we can derive realized volatility from stock returns, we can extract this from the model in 
a manner similar to that used for equity option implied volatility. 
We therefore use market CDS spreads as an input in the model and derive the equity 
volatility (CDSIV) implied by the market.   Once we have this measure, we compare it 
against the realized volatility using 22 and 250 day windows (Table 2.4).  Our choice of 
length for the windows stems from the fact that as our EOIV data is for options with 
approximately 20 days to expiration, the EOIV should be able to predict return volatility 
over this period.  For similar reasons, as we use 5-year CDS, we would like to use a 1,250 
day period as well.  However, given that our data is from 2005-2006, we are limited to 
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using 250 days as a longer period would take us beyond 2008 for which realized volatility 
is not available. 
Consistent with findings of the Uhrig-Homburg paper (2002), we find the EOIV to be the 
best predictor for the 22-day period since it matches the duration of the options data being 
used.  However, over the longer horizon, we find that historical volatility is the best 
predictor of realized volatility.   
2.5. Omitted Risk Factors 
The results of the two tests of the model show that our model fails to accurately estimate 
market CDS spreads.  Looking at some of the literature reviewed in the earlier sections, 
we believe that the addition of certain macroeconomic risk factors may improve the 
performance of our model.  Additionally, CDS liquidity may be an omitted factor in our 
model as we believe that it is a proxy for risk in the CDS market. 
2.5.1 Liquidity  
Longstaff et al (2005) argue that CDS contracts are much less vulnerable to liquidity 
pressures than bonds which have a fixed supply.  Further, as CDS are cheaper to transact 
than bonds, liquidity concerns are much less relevant in the case of these swaps.  They 
therefore assume that CDS levels represent the true level of credit risk.  However, we 
believe, depending on the level of credit risk involved, there may be an element of 
liquidity reflected in the spreads which can be represented by an inverted-U curve. 
In the absence of fixed supply quantities and with much lower transaction costs, CDS 
liquidity represents the demand and supply situation reflecting the market perception 
about the risk of the underlying bond.  Our intuition is that there is likely to be low 
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demand for the very low risk firms and therefore, this would result in low CDS liquidity.  
As we move towards the riskier firms, demand for credit insurance would increase, 
resulting in greater liquidity in the market.   
However, beyond a certain level of risk, suppliers of insurance would stop providing 
cover to bond holders, thereby drying up liquidity in the market.  As a result, the risk-
liquidity curve would have an inverted-U shape. The source of low liquidity in case of the 
low risk firms would be demand-based while at the higher end would be supply-based.   
In either case, it would make hedging more difficult as one side would require more 
compensation to take on the position. 
As the CDS market is OTC, we use the bid-ask spread standardized by the mid-price as a 
proxy for liquidity.  In this paper, we test the relationship between liquidity and 
mispricing to see if traders are charging a premium for the illiquid CDS.  A Hausman test 
shows that a Fixed-Effects model is appropriate for our panel data and we look at both, 
contemporaneous (equation I below) as well as 5-day lagged FE regressions (equation II) 
to find liquidity to explain some of the mispricing in both sets of regressions - our 
regression results are provided in Table 2.5.   
Mispricingi,t  = i + ’Liquidityi,t + i,t     - Equation I  
Mispricingi,t  = i + ’Liquidityi,(t-1 to t-5) + i,t   - Equation II  
Where,  
Mispricingi,t  = Mispricing for firm i at time t (i.e. Market CDSi,t – Model  
CDSi,t); 
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i    = Individual effect (assumed constant over time); 
    = Regression coefficient; 
Liquidityi,t   = Change in liquidity for firm i at time t;
Liquidityi,(t-1 to t-5)  = 5-day lagged changes in liquidity for firm i; 
i,t    = Stochastic error term  
The liquidity t-stat of 13.04 and 14.93 in the case of contemporaneous and lagged 
regressions strengthens our assertion above that it may be playing a role in market 
spreads.  However, we recognize the t-stats of 50.22 and 45.18 for the constant as 
capturing other variables that may explain the remaining part of the mispricing.   
As the purpose of this study is to explain the mispricing from the CreditGrades model, we 
use liquidity as a variable in the pricing regression and analyse the relationship between 
liquidity and risk in a subsequent paper.   
2.5.2 Market Factors  
Using the factors outlined in the data section, we extend our analysis to using market 
factors in a FE model to explain changes to the market CDS spreads. To avoid unit-root 
issues, we take the first differences for all variables in the model.  Furthermore, we use 5-
day lagged values of the factors as it allows us to capture the dynamic market 
environment better than a one-day snapshot would do.  The regression equation is in form 
outlined below. 
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Mkt_CDSi,t = i + 1’Mkt_CDSi,(t-1 to t-5)'Risk_Factori,(t-1 to t-5) + i,t 
Where,  
Mkt_CDSi,t   = Change in Market CDS Spread for firm i at time t; 
i    = Individual effect (assumed constant over time); 
    = Regression coefficients; 
Mkt_CDSi,(t-1 to t-5)  = 5-day lag values of Changes in Market CDS Spreads for firm i; 
Risk_Factori,t  = 5-day lag values of changes in omitted risk factors for firm i;  
i,t    = Stochastic error term  
In addition to testing each market risk factor against the market CDS spread changes, we 
use, as the independent variable, the model generated spreads, the CDSIV as well as 
liquidity since our prior test has shown it to be significant in explaining the mispricing.  
Before running the regression, we test the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for the 
explanatory variables to check for multicollinearity (Table 2.6).  Other than the lagged 
market CDS spread changes and the CDSIV which reflect slightly elevated VIF levels, all 
other variables are below the threshold level of 4.   
We also check the one-to-one correlations between the market CDS spread changes and 
CDSIV to find a high level of correlation ranging between 0.3 and 0.8.  This can be 
explained by the fact that determining the CDSIV requires using market CDS spreads as 
an input and we may be capturing the interplay between the two.  
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Based on the results presented in Table 2.7, we find that, as expected, lagged values of 
changes in CDSIV are the most important factor for explaining market spread changes as 
they have an adjusted R-square of 16.1%.  The strength of this factor can be attributed to 
the fact that the CDSIV incorporates data from the CDS market, the stock market and 
firm level accounting information.  In contrast, the model CDS spreads do not use data 
from the CDS market and as a result, the CDSIV presents a factor with a richer 
representation of information.  
With regards to the stock market and macroeconomic factors we find the following to be 
significant:  
1) Stock index returns (-2.239) have a negative relationship with CDS spread 
changes.  This relationship is as expected since a decrease in index levels are 
experienced with growing risk and therefore increasing CDS spreads. 
2) Index return volatility (1.736) has a positive relationship since higher volatility 
shows increasing risk. 
3) Business Sentiment (0.495) reflects an inverse relationship since an improvement 
in business sentiment should be met with a reduction in risk spreads. 
4) The coefficient on the risk premium (-1.933) suggests that CDS spreads decrease 
with an increase in the risk premium.  While this is counterintuitive and contrary 
to expectations, it may be a result of the type of firms included in our dataset.  As 
we are only considering the Dow-30 names, these firms are typically larger and 
less risky than most other firms in the market.  Therefore, it may be that with an 
increase in the general market risk premium, investors increase exposure on the 
Dow-30 names and reduce exposure on the relatively more risky firms.  As a 
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result, the reduced demand for Dow-30 CDS would result in a decrease in their 
spreads while spreads for other firms may increase.  However, without a formal 
study of the relative movement in spreads between firms with different ratings, it 
is difficult to confirm the reason for this result. 
We find that the other variables are not significant in explaining credit risk movements.   
2.5.3 Multi-factor Analysis 
Having established some of the factors that are important in explaining the changes in 
CDS spreads, we extend our analysis to running them in a multivariate setting that 
includes model derived variables as well.  As our intent is to identify factors that may 
explain risk beyond levels suggested by our model, we ensure that either CDSIV or the 
Model Based CDS Spreads are included in our regressions.   
With regards to the evidence of strong correlation between the Market CDS spreads and 
the CDSIV, we avoid using both factors in the same regression as it could lead to flawed 
results.  Using a stepwise variable selection process that includes either Market CDS 
Spreads or CDSIV, we drop any risk factors that lose significance in a multivariate 
setting to arrive at the results presented in Table 2.8. 
Our key findings are as follows: 
1) Based on the adjusted R-square of 16.8% versus 13.2%, we find lagged CDSIV 
values explain CDS spreads movements better than the lagged values of CDS 
spreads.  As discussed earlier, a possible reason is that the CDSIV is extracted 
from the model that includes market CDS spreads, stock returns as well as 
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accounting data on debt per share and is therefore carrying more information than 
the market CDS spread itself.   
2) Liquidity (0.077 and 0.071) remains significant in both regressions which 
contradicts some of the arguments in existing literature.  However, we believe 
that, unlike bonds where supply is limited by the number of bonds available in the 
market, liquidity in the CDS market is a function of the demand-supply which is 
driven by the risk of the underlying bond.  Therefore, it can be taken as a 
reflection of risk and should be a pricing factor in the model.   
3) Stock Index Volatility and Risk Premium are both significant in explaining the 
CDS spread changes.  However, further investigation into the relationship 
between risk premium and CDS spreads is required to test if the relationship 
varies with the risk of the underlying bond. 
With a constant that is significantly different from zero and an adjusted R-squared 
ranging between 13.2% to 16.8%, we recognize that there are yet other factors that the 
CreditGrades model may not be pricing.  Looking at the residuals from the two 
regressions, we find them to have a correlation of 0.95 confirming that there are one or 
more omitted risk factors that are common to the two regressions and need to be included 
in the pricing models.   
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2.6. Conclusion 
Credit risk plays a key role in the current market environment and is expected to become 
increasingly important.  Therefore, it is imperative that the market is able to price credit 
risk accurately.  However, we have seen from previous studies as well as our own tests 
that these models fail to price risk in line with what the market spreads. 
We test one of the leading commercial pricing models, CreditGrades, to find that it is 
unable to generate the spreads seen in the market.  Using different factors, we introduce 
various risk proxies that are not included in the CreditGrades model to help improve the 
fit of our model from 12% to 16.8%.   We therefore suggest incorporating these measures 
into the pricing model to improve its ability to price risk.   
Interestingly, contrary to arguments in previous papers that CDS spreads are unaffected 
by liquidity, we find liquidity to be priced in CDS spreads.  In light of this result, we 
believe the relationship between credit spreads and liquidity deserves further examination 
and postulate the shape of the relationship as an avenue for follow-up research.  We also 
find that an increase in risk premiums is met by a decrease in credit spreads which is 
contrary to our intuition on the matter and also requires further study.  
Even after including market and economic variables, we can only explain a small part of 
the changes in market spreads and observe a strong correlation between the residuals of 
the two multivariate regressions.  This suggests that some common factors that could 
improve the fit of the model have been omitted from the model.  Until these factors are 
identified and priced, markets remain vulnerable to the possibility that the market CDS 
spreads may still not be reflecting the true credit risk completely.  
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Appendix 
2.A. CreditGrades Parameters 
The CreditGrades model requires eight inputs to compute the credit spread, namely the 
share price (S), the equity volatility ( s

), the debt per share (D), the interest rate (r), the 
time to expiration (T), the overall recovery rate ( L ), the recovery rate standard deviation 
( ) and the debt recovery rate (R).  
While we may be able to come up with the values for the first five variables, the recovery 
rates and the related standard deviation are not directly observable.   CreditGrades allows 
users to plug in their own estimates but as a default it uses a measure of 50% for L  and 
30% for , based on estimates derived from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) LossStats 
database.    As our intention is to use the model as the investors, we continue to use the 
same recovery rates in our analysis. 
Given that the CDS are traded in an OTC market, data availability is an issue.  To the 
best of our knowledge, the Markit Group is currently the only institution that collects 
trading data from all the major traders on a daily basis and in turn, provides the market 
data to the participating trading firms and certain financial database like 
Thomson/DataStream etc.  As a result, the CDS spreads represent an average of the 
closing spreads that the trading institutions report to Markit. 
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2.B.   The CreditGrades Model  
As with other structural models, CreditGrades models the firm value against a default 
barrier where a default occurs when the firm value crosses the barrier from above.   The 
model used by CreditGrades assumes that the value of the assets evolves through 
Brownian motion with the following structure: 
t
t D
t
dV
dW dt
V
  
 
Where W defines standard Brownian motion,   is the volatility of the assets, D

is the 
drift which we assume to be equal to zero.   
A zero drift is assumed since the focus of the model is the drift of the asset value relative 
to the default barrier and if the firm, on average, maintains leverage at a steady level, debt 
will have the same drift as the stock price. 
Structural models have been seen to reflect low short-term spreads due to their inability 
to reflect true ex-ante market value of debt resulting in an underestimated default barrier 
level.  CreditGrades addresses this by introducing a jump process in the diffusion process 
to allow defaults to occur close to start of the model. 
The default barrier is defined as L.D where L is the average recovery rate and D is the 
debt/share for the firm.  To increase the short-term spreads, randomness is introduced to 
the recovery rate which is assumed to follow the following lognormal distribution with 
mean L and standard deviation . 
L  = EL; 
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2 =Var ln(L); and  
LD = L D
2 / 2Ze   
Z has a standard normal distribution, independent of the Brownian motion.  The 
introduction of the randomness to Z implies that there is a true value of Z which is 
unknown at the start and is only known once default takes place. 
Furthermore, default does not occur as long as the asset value is greater than the default 
barrier level giving us the following constraint: 
2 2/ 2 / 2
0
tW t ZV e LDe
    
 
An event of default will not occur until the first passage of Vt to the default threshold of 
L.D.  The survival probability, P(t), at time t is therefore given by the probability that the 
asset value does not cross the default barrier before time t.  represents the asset volatility 
while s is the equity volatility with the relationship:  
1s
LD
S
 
 
  
   
The CreditGrades model arrives at a solution for the probability as the following: 
log( ) log( )
( ) .
2 2
t t
t t
A Ad d
P t d
A A
   
          
     
Where    
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2
0
2 2 2
t
V e
d
LD
A t

 

   
 
In order to convert the probability model to a specific credit price, two more parameters 
need to be defined, r, the risk-free rate and R, the recovery rate on the asset.  The 
difference between R and L  is that former pertains to the recovery rate for a specific 
class of debt while L  is the average recovery rate for all debt classes. 
To compute the credit spread, c*, the model equates the expected premium payments to 
the expected loss payout to arrive at the following: 
* 1 (0) ( ( ) ( ))(1 )
(0) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
r
rt r
P e G t G
c r R
P P t e e G t G


 
 
   
 
     
Where 
2
2
1/ 2 1/ 2
2
log( ) log( )
( )
1 2
4
z zd dG u d z u d z u
u u
rz


 
 

  

   
          
   
 
 
With the model for deriving the credit spreads completely defined, it is important that we 
convert the model specifications into easily measurable parameters.  We must use the 
relationship between asset volatility and the observable equity volatility to arrive at a 
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more meaningful parameter for volatility.  With a share price of S, we use the 
approximationV S LD   to get:  
 
1s
LD
S
 
 
  
   
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Figure 2.2 - Map of Market vs. Model Spreads 
The following charts present the Market and Model CDS Spreads (bppa) on the primary y-axis 
and the Share Price (U$) on the secondary Y-axis. 
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Table 2.2 
Summary Statistics on Market and Model CDS  
 Market CDS Spreads Model CDS Spreads 
  Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
Alcoa      23.92       14.50       59.50         6.99       20.56          8.50       41.29         9.50  
Boeing      16.67         7.92       31.25         4.56       12.22          2.34       31.92         8.04  
Caterpillar      19.15       13.00       40.50         4.23       28.24        13.35       53.77       11.21  
DuPont      17.97         8.00       30.10         4.26         1.42          0.11         3.38         0.87  
Disney      26.83       11.00       48.83         9.18         9.13          0.65       18.32         5.63  
Home Depot      12.12         6.88       24.50         3.06         0.58          0.11         1.20         0.31  
Honeywell      17.65       10.00       29.50         2.84       24.51          3.01       69.32       17.57  
Hewlett Packard      24.70       10.00       61.50         8.89       31.97          2.69       93.73       27.81  
IBM      17.71         8.00       30.50         4.34         2.68          0.36         9.05         2.45  
Johnson & Johnson        5.44         2.83       10.50         1.97         0.00          0.00         0.00         0.00  
Coca Cola      10.94         6.50       17.50         2.46         0.00          0.00         0.00         0.00  
McDonalds      22.22       11.00       39.17         8.22         1.06          0.17         2.24         0.45  
3M        7.04         1.50       15.75         1.92         0.00          0.00         0.00         0.00  
Altria      70.03       22.50      126.25       29.94         1.84          0.16         8.44         2.06  
Merck      19.16         6.00       40.50         9.42         0.62          0.09         1.90         0.46  
Pfizer        8.94         3.50       21.50         3.58         0.15          0.00         0.89         0.21  
P & G      14.35         5.25       20.50         3.66         0.02          0.00         0.13         0.03  
A T & T      29.96       15.19       44.50         6.67       15.00          3.92       30.91         7.81  
United Technologies      15.57         8.50       32.25         3.93         3.23          0.11         7.04         2.12  
Verizon Technologies      32.64       15.00       93.50       20.85         6.20          1.99       13.30         3.17  
General Electric      18.99       10.75       31.50         5.08       60.48        29.13       90.18       16.18  
Wal-Mart      11.56         5.00       23.50         3.11         0.21          0.01         0.80         0.20  
Exxon Mobil        6.54         2.00       12.44         2.32         0.00          0.00         0.00         0.00  
Overall      19.57         1.50      126.25       15.82         9.57          0.00       93.73       17.01  
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Table 2.3 
Mean Error of Difference between Market and Model CDS 
  Mean Error Min Max Std. Dev. 
Alcoa          (3.36)         (25.84)   20.14         8.04  
Boeing          (4.45)         (13.85)   14.59         4.92  
Caterpillar           9.09           (3.81)   30.02         8.68  
DuPont         (16.55)         (28.72)    (5.52)        4.35  
Disney         (17.70)         (35.62)    (4.97)        5.96  
Home Depot         (11.54)         (23.83)    (6.74)        3.02  
Honeywell           6.86          (14.62)   52.22       16.47  
Hewlett Packard           7.27          (16.36)   68.98       22.34  
IBM         (15.03)         (23.17)    (7.20)        3.26  
Johnson & Johnson          (5.44)         (10.50)    (2.83)        1.97  
Coca Cola         (10.94)         (17.50)    (6.50)        2.46  
McDonalds         (21.16)         (38.28)  (10.76)        8.06  
3M          (7.04)         (15.75)    (1.50)        1.92  
Altria         (68.20)       (122.60)  (22.32)      28.52  
Merck         (18.55)         (39.22)    (5.90)        9.02  
Pfizer          (8.78)         (20.73)    (3.47)        3.42  
P & G         (14.33)         (20.46)    (5.25)        3.64  
A T & T         (14.96)         (38.71)     3.41         8.69  
United Technologies         (12.34)         (26.83)    (5.08)        3.05  
Verizon Technologies         (26.44)         (90.92)    (8.70)      22.71  
General Electric          41.49           17.13    67.04       12.08  
Wal-Mart         (11.35)         (22.96)    (4.55)        3.03  
Exxon Mobil          (6.54)         (12.44)    (2.00)        2.32  
Overall         (10.00)       (122.60)   68.98       21.38  
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Table 2.4 
Equity Volatility Root Mean Square Error (using 22 and 250 day rolling windows) 
 22-Days 250-Days 
  Historical  CDS IV Equity IV Historical CDS IV Equity IV 
Alcoa        0.067  0.128 0.073 0.038 0.093 0.042 
Boeing        0.072  0.130 0.058 0.022 0.123 0.041 
Caterpillar        0.126  0.087 0.081 0.034 0.022 0.028 
DuPont        0.058  0.189 0.051 0.025 0.182 0.038 
Disney        0.062  0.226 0.058 0.018 0.218 0.042 
Home Depot        0.058  0.269 0.047 0.015 0.266 0.038 
Honeywell        0.055  0.165 0.055 0.017 0.159 0.044 
Hewlett Packard        0.128  0.191 0.099 0.051 0.183 0.083 
IBM        0.068  0.229 0.060 0.034 0.221 0.040 
Johnson & Johnson        0.050  0.379 0.055 0.022 0.377 0.047 
Coca Cola        0.046  0.398 0.049 0.030 0.394 0.041 
McDonalds        0.054  0.209 0.070 0.050 0.204 0.070 
3M        0.093  0.287 0.068 0.021 0.272 0.033 
Altria        0.076  0.321 0.108 0.026 0.317 0.096 
Merck        0.128  0.241 0.094 0.101 0.226 0.039 
Pfizer        0.119  0.229 0.088 0.033 0.208 0.054 
P & G        0.042  0.240 0.047 0.012 0.237 0.035 
A T & T        0.052  0.201 0.061 0.033 0.181 0.038 
United Technologies        0.069  0.222 0.053 0.015 0.216 0.036 
Verizon Technologies        0.055  0.224 0.057 0.017 0.208 0.038 
General Electric        0.035  0.078 0.044 0.021 0.074 0.037 
Wal-Mart        0.045  0.223 0.051 0.016 0.209 0.031 
Exxon Mobil        0.062  0.238 0.058 0.038 0.238 0.042 
Overall        0.070  0.222 0.065 0.030 0.210 0.045 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 
Regression of Mispricing and Liquidity 
Contemporaneous (1) and 5-day lagged (2) regressions (t-stats in italics) 
  Constant Liquidity Adj-R
2
 
1    (13.277)     12.294       0.013  
      (50.22)      13.04    
2    (14.716)     17.871       0.017  
      (45.18)      14.93    
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Table 2.6 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)  
 Market Spread Stock Return Model IV Model Spread Liquidity Stock Index 3M Tbill Bus. Sentiment Risk Prem Eq Option IV 
Lag 0 - 1.30 1.28 1.01 1.80 1.32 1.18 1.16 1.36 1.32 
Lag 1 4.30 1.39 4.46 1.04 2.03 1.43 1.12 1.07 1.48 1.44 
Lag 2 4.28 1.33 4.56 1.04 2.05 1.38 1.10 1.06 1.48 1.45 
Lag 3 4.29 1.33 4.58 1.04 2.05 1.39 1.11 1.05 1.48 1.45 
Lag 4 4.27 1.33 4.56 1.04 2.04 1.39 1.15 1.05 1.47 1.44 
Lag 5 4.09 1.33 4.54 1.04 1.82 1.37 1.19 1.15 1.24 1.32 
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Table 2.7 
Univariate Regression of Market CDS and Risk Factors (5-day Lagged FE Regression; t-stats in italics)  
   Model Variables Firm Level Variables Stock Market Variables Macroeconomic Variables  
 Constant 
Market 
Spread CDSIV 
Model 
Spread Liquidity 
Stock  
Return EOIV 
Index 
Returns 
Index 
Volatility 
Business 
Sentiment 
3M 
Tbill 
Risk 
Premium 
Term 
Premium Adj-R
2
 
                    1  0.007 (0.635)            0.120 
  7.02 (21.39)             
                    2  0.005 (0.188) (5.475)           0.161 
  5.04 (5.05) (17.14)            
                    3  0.007 (0.636)  (0.002)          0.120 
  7.07 (21.41)  (2.00)           
                    4  (0.127) (0.610)   0.077         0.125 
  (3.77) (20.39)   6.22          
                    5  0.008 (0.641)    (0.506)        0.120 
  7.16 (21.55)    (3.22)         
                    6  0.007 (0.639)     0.155       0.120 
  6.93 (21.48)     2.02        
                    7  0.008 (0.647)      (2.239)      0.122 
  7.89 (21.75)      (5.53)       
                    8  (0.003) (0.641)       1.736     0.120 
  (0.74) (21.55)       2.44      
                    9  0.008 (0.637)        (0.495)    0.120 
  7.20 (21.42)        (2.12)     
                   10  0.008 (0.635)         (0.150)   0.120 
  7.05 (21.39)         (1.63)    
                   11  0.009 (0.675)          (1.933)  0.126 
  8.26 (22.37)          (6.88)   
                   12  0.007 (0.635)           0.001 0.119 
  6.99 (21.38)           0.18  
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Table 2.8 
Multivariate Regression of Market CDS and Risk Factors (5-day lagged FE Model; t-stats in italics)  
   Model Variables Firm Level Variables Stock Market Variables Macroeconomic Variables  
  Constant 
Market 
Spread CDSIV 
Model 
Spread Liquidity 
Stock 
Return EOIV 
Index 
Return 
Index 
Volatility 
Business 
Sentiment 
3M 
Tbill 
Risk 
Premium 
Term 
Premium 
Adj-
R
2
 
                    
1  (0.022) (0.654)  (0.002) 0.077    1.673 (0.055)  (1.687)  0.132 
  (3.65) (21.48)  (2.09) 6.21    2.28 (2.30)  (5.75)   
                    
2  (0.025)  (6.541)  0.071    1.949   (2.040)  0.168 
  (4.34)  (25.79)  5.87    2.75   (7.21)   
                    
3  (0.024) (0.214) (5.533)  0.074    1.916   (2.178)  0.173 
  (4.25) (5.73) (17.33)  6.11    2.71   (7.68)   
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Chapter 3. Dealer Quotes and Their Impact on Price Discovery 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Credit default swaps are contracts on corporate or sovereign debt that insure investors against 
events of default on the underlying credit.   While the CDS market grew at a rapid pace up until 
2007 when it was valued at $58 tln (notional underlying exposure), the recent slowdown and 
issues with AIG and other financial institutions has led to a decline in the market size to $32.6 tln 
in Dec 2009
8
.  As a result, the credit derivatives market has been receiving a lot of attention of 
late with demands to tighten regulations and move it to an exchange based environment from its 
current OTC structure.   
Developing effective regulations for this market requires a sound understanding of the pricing 
practices for these instruments, the factors affecting trading activity in the market and the general 
behaviour of market participants.  Unfortunately, this is an OTC market and data availability is 
an issue.  Given this limitation, most of the research on CDS has focused either on the pricing of 
these instruments or on asset pricing models to study factors affecting CDS spreads. 
In a typical CDS transaction, investors looking to hedge their credit exposure, contact dealers 
who quote bid and ask spreads.  Once an agreement is reached, the dealers return to the market to 
close out the resulting short position on the underlying credit.  In order to square his position, a 
dealer can either get into a long contract with other dealers at the prevailing ask rate or make his 
bid rate more attractive to investors looking to sell cover.  Although we do not have access to 
data on internal dealer positions and intra-day quotes, we use the daily closing bid and ask 
                                                 
8
 http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf 
52 
spreads to develop a proxy that signals the combined position of the dealers in the market.  While 
this may be a limitation in our data, our paper makes a contribution to literature by introducing a 
dimension not yet researched in the CDS market. Our initial findings are promising and this area 
should be researched further as more detailed data becomes available.   
We look at changes in bid and ask spreads for 198 companies where a larger increase in bid 
when compared to the change in ask signals that dealers want to go long as they are making the 
bid quote relatively more attractive.  This practice of “quote shading” is well documented in 
literature on foreign exchange markets which are also OTC like the CDS market.   
Our analysis reflects quote shading in around 10% of the data but would be wrong to conclude 
that dealers only have open positions 10% of the time.  It is likely that instead of adjusting bid 
quotes, dealers typically cover their open short positions at prevailing market ask spreads so as 
not to reveal information about their positions.  Unfortunately, without more detailed data, it is 
not possible to identify such occurrences.    
Dealers do not like to carry open positions given the risk of credit deterioration and we expect to 
find a greater incidence of quote shading during periods of high risk.  Using put-call ratios on 
equity options as a signal of market expectations about the firm’s risk, we find a weak yet 
statistically significant correlation between quote shading and firm risk. 
Using the premise that dealers do not like to hold short positions over extended periods of time, 
we also expect to find evidence of quote shading on Fridays or before the start of holidays i.e. on 
trading days before market closure.  However, we find a negative yet statistically significant 
relationship between the two indicating that quote shading does not occur close to holidays. 
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Based on these initial results, we extend our analysis to see if there is any evidence of day-of-the-
week effects on CDS liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread - a liquidity proxy developed 
by Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  Our regression results show that liquidity decreases the most 
on Mondays and Fridays and least on Tuesdays which is similar to Chardia et al (2001) findings 
for equity markets.   
Using an error correction model, we test price discovery with and without quote shading.  To 
clarify, we do not focus on price discovery dynamics between the CDS and stock market but 
instead look at differences in price discovery in the CDS market with and without quote shading.  
While the average price discovery share of CDS is lower in the market with quote shading, we 
are unable to find a statistically significant difference between the price discovery levels for 
periods with and without quote shading. 
We extend our tests of price discovery to high and low risk periods given evidence of quote 
shading during periods of high risk to analyse the impact a risk change has on price discovery in 
the CDS market.  We find that while most of the price information comes from the equity 
market, CDS market contribution to price discovery is higher during low risk periods when there 
is less prevalence of quote shading.   
Quote shading is just one explanation for this difference in price discovery dynamics and 
changes in liquidity levels during high and low risk periods could also be used to explain the 
price discovery changes.  We therefore test the relationship between liquidity and firm risk levels 
but do not find any statistically significant relationship between the two. 
Our main findings from this paper are that CDS dealers can modify quotes to manage their open 
position and that this practice can result in a loss of market informational efficiency. The 
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contribution of this paper is to look at an area of the CDS market that has not been studied 
before.  Furthermore, given data limitations, our results are encouraging and merit further 
investigation using more detailed data.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section is a literature survey 
and our key test hypotheses while Section 3.3 looks at the data set and introduces some summary 
statistics.  We define and test for evidence of quote shading and correlations in Section 3.4.   In 
Section 3.5 we test day-of-the-week effects on CDS liquidity and present the price discovery 
tests in Section 3.6.  The conclusion follows in Section 3.7.   
3.2. Literature Review 
In a working paper, Stulz (2009), explains how CDS dealers like to close out their exposure after 
getting into a short position as they are in the business of making a market for CDS and not of 
carrying risk on the underlying.  It follows that when they sell protection to an investor, they try 
to book a matching long position as soon as possible using one of the following two routes:  
1. buying protection from other dealers at the prevailing ask rate, or 
2. offering attractive bid rates to investors looking to sell insurance.  
The purpose of this paper is to look for evidence of the latter by CDS dealers and its impact on 
price discovery in the market.    To the best of our knowledge, no other study has looked at this 
aspect of the CDS market.  Therefore, to get some theoretical support for our hypotheses, we 
turn to the foreign exchange market, another OTC market, where the price shading phenomenon 
has been well documented.  
Market microstructure theory looks at two models of order flow to explain price movements.  
The information or adverse selection models use information asymmetry between informed and 
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uninformed traders to explain price movements.  The underlying premise is that dealers adjust 
prices when they transact with informed traders to avoid being taken advantage of.  However, as 
it is difficult to distinguish between informed and uninformed traders, dealers look to increase 
price if there is a buyer for the inventory and decrease price if the other party is selling.   
The other model commonly used is the one we focus on and it draws on inventory management 
by dealers to explain price movements.  Garman (1976) was one of the first to introduce the idea 
that dealers adjust the price to avoid bankruptcy and manage inventory.  This idea was developed 
further by Amihud and Mendelson (1980) who built a multi-period model where dealers increase 
prices if their inventory is shrinking and reduce prices in case of inventory declines.  This was a 
key paper introducing price shading in the forex market and papers have followed-up by 
developing this concept further.   
The important idea is that both models have the same result on prices i.e. buyer initiated trades 
result in an upward pressure on price and seller initiated trades result in a downward pressure on 
price. 
From an empirical standpoint, Lyons (1995) looks at the DM/U$ market and finds evidence of 
both, information and inventory effects, on the part of the dealers quoting rates in the market.  He 
finds that a dealer will not only increase the spread to protect himself against informed traders 
but also carry out quote shading to attract trades that help him manage inventory. 
Bjonnes and Rime (2005) look at interbank dealers in the forex market to find that dealers 
actively control their inventory positions.  As evidence of quote shading, they expect to see the 
forex quote dependent on existing inventory levels but fail to find a relationship between the two.  
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As a result, they argue that dealers use market orders to control their inventory and avoid 
adjusting price (i.e. quote shading) since it may reveal information about their position. 
Cheung and Wong (2000)  surveyed 392 practitioners in the interbank forex market in Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Tokyo to find that while bid-ask spreads are generally fixed in those 
markets, a small percentage of the respondents confirmed that they carried out quote shading to 
manage the risk of an adverse inventory position.  Furthermore, they suggest that this inventory 
risk increases when markets are more volatile.  As a result, we would expect to see quote shading 
occur more frequently in the CDS market when the overall market and firm risk are higher, 
leading to our first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between quote shading and firm risk. 
Based on the premise that a dealer’s CDS position has an impact on the quote he provides, we 
also test if the quote is affected by the dealer’s ability to close out his position.  Unfortunately as 
we do not have access to intra-day quotes, we can only use daily spreads to see if there is a 
pattern to spread movements close to the end of the week.  Chordia et al (2001) look at the US 
equities market to find that trading activity and liquidity are low on Fridays and high on 
Tuesdays.   As CDS dealers would not like to carry open short or long positions over weekends 
when trading is not possible, we expect CDS market liquidity to be high (i.e. tighter bid-ask 
spreads) on Fridays as they try to close out their positions prior to the start of the weekend. 
H2: The bid-ask spread is smallest on Fridays when compared to the other days of the week. 
There has been a fair amount of research on price discovery in the CDS market when compared 
to the stock and bond markets.  The general findings of Longstaff et al. (2005), Norden and 
Weber (2007), Blanco et al. (2005) and others is that while both CDS and stocks lead the less 
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liquid bond markets, stocks typically lead CDS except in cases of higher risk firms where CDS 
lead.  In another paper, we test price discovery in the stock and CDS markets before and after the 
financial crisis to find that the stock market continues to be the primary market where 
information is revealed.  
However, none of the studies we found looked at CDS price discovery in the backdrop of price 
adjustment made by dealers to manage their risk positions.   Therefore, if CDS dealers rely on 
quote shading to manage short CDS positions, they would narrow bid-ask spreads when net short 
and increase them if they hold a net long position.   This adjustment may put pressure on spreads 
that is contrary to the direction of market pressure.  As a result, we expect to find price discovery 
to be lower when dealers resort to quote shading i.e. during high risk periods. 
H3: Price discovery will be lower during periods of quote shading.  
3.3. Data  
We use daily CDS mid-spreads on 5-year senior, unsecured corporate bonds from the Thomson 
DataStream database for the period 1 Jan 2005 to 30 October 2009 as these represent the most 
liquid instruments in the CDS market. The data represents the average of daily reported spreads 
from 13 key sellers in the CDS market. As a result, we may not be able to pick out quote shading 
by individual dealers but will observe it when the dealers collectively resort to it.   We start with 
a database of over 600 firms but after eliminating firms without stock or option data or firms 
with CDS data that appears to be missing or is questionable, we are left with 198 firms 
representing a total of 249,480 data points.    
We use adjusted daily share prices for the period under study to arrive at the share log returns.  
To capture the “risk” of the firm, we use a measure known as the put-call ratio.  Pan and 
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Poteshman (2006) use the ratio of the volume of puts to the volume of calls and find it to be a 
good predictor of future share performance.  A higher put-call ratio suggests that more investors 
are long puts than are long calls and the market is therefore bearish on the firm.  As the CDS 
spread is also a reflection of the future risk associated with a business, we believe the two 
measures are well aligned in that they both reflect the market’s risk expectations about a 
business.   The options data is sourced through the Optionmetrics database.   
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for our daily data.  The average of the average daily CDS 
spread for the 198 firms is 107 bppa, while the average annual share return is 2.2% and the 
average put-call ratio is 1.63.  The average share return has been calculated as the annualized 
compounded growth rate and not as the mean of the average daily returns since positive and 
negative returns would cancel out leaving us with an incorrect estimate.  With regards to the put-
call ratio, the market generally considers a ratio of 0.8 or over as a bearish outlook signal and a 
ratio of 0.6 or below as a signal of bullish outlook.  Therefore the average of 1.63 for our data 
may seem high but it should be pointed out that our data includes the period of the financial 
crisis.   
3.4. Quote Shading 
In a typical trade, a fund manager, looking to hedge his exposure on a company, will call a dealer 
to get a quote for buying CDS protection on his exposure.  The dealer will quote both bid and ask 
spreads and if acceptable, the investor will purchase insurance cover through the dealer at the ask 
rate, resulting in a short position for the dealer.  As the dealer is in the business of market making 
for CDS and does not take on credit exposure on his books, he subsequently returns to the market 
to get into a long position on the same risk to close out his position.   Therefore, a completed 
CDS transaction results in a net-zero position for the dealer. 
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For the purpose of our study, we focus on the scale of change in the bid and ask spreads.  In an 
initial review of daily spreads, we observe asymmetric changes in the bid and ask spreads for the 
same underlying asset e.g. ask spread on Company A may increase by 10 bps while the bid 
quoted for Company A increases by 15 bps on the same day.  As we normally expect to see 
symmetric changes in the spreads, this liquidity change may point to some form of quote 
adjustment taking place where dealers with short (long) positions on Company A may be 
offering more attractive bid (ask) rates to investors to get into a long (short) position and close 
out their exposure. 
There are three types of spread movements possible in bid and ask quotes, i.e. increase, decrease 
or no change.  Figure 3.1 displays all possible types of changes in the bid and ask quotes as well 
as the scale of change in these quotes.   
  
Change 
  
Ch Ask > Ch Bid Ch Ask = Ch Bid 
Ch Ask < Ch 
Bid 
Ask inc 
Bid inc - - I 
Bid same - 
Bid dec - - - 
Ask 
same 
Bid inc II 
Bid Same - 
Bid dec - 
Ask dec 
Bid inc - - III 
Bid Same - 
Bid dec - - - 
Figure 3.1 Quote Shading Defined 
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We define quote shading as one of the following set of movements in the bid and ask spreads 
(shaded cells in Figure 3.1 above): 
I) Ask and bid both increase but bid increases by more than ask. 
II) Ask remains unchanged but bid increases. 
III) Ask decreases while bid increases and the absolute change in bid is greater than the absolute 
change in ask. 
We should note that in all three instances, we see a tightening of the bid-ask spread i.e. an 
increase in market liquidity.  In our data, we find liquidity increasing (bid-ask spread decrease) 
in 53,271 data points and decreasing (bid-ask spread increase) in 53,943 instances and no change 
in liquidity in the remaining 142,224 data points.  Therefore, as quote shading would be evident 
in cases where liquidity increases, we are looking at a maximum possible 53,271 data points.   
Based on our definition of quote shading, we find evidence of it in 24,384 instances i.e. in 45.7% 
of increased liquidity data points or 9.77% overall.  We next look at the days characterised by 
high volatility i.e. put-call ratio in excess of 0.8 for a total of 113,831 data days.  There are a total 
of 49,896 weekend and holidays in our entire data set.   
Looking at quote shading on days when either the put-call ratio is more than 0.8 or the following 
day is a holiday.  We find this occurring 16,198 times i.e. on 66% of the days that we find 
dealers offering relatively more attractive bid quotes, the market is either assigning a negative 
outlook to the firm or is before a holiday.  A firmwise snapshot is given in Table 3.2. 
To test if the relationship between quote shading and high volatility and weekends is statistically 
significant, we take the correlation between the variables (Table 3.3) and find a positive, 
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significant relationship between quote shading and high volatility days.  This suggests that if a 
dealer is in a net short CDS position, we are more likely to see him adjust the bid quote to attract 
sellers if the firm is higher risk.   
Conducting the same test for quote shading and weekends, we find a negative, significant 
relationship reflecting that dealers are more likely to carry out quote shading during weekdays 
than weekends.  This result is contrary to our expectations as it does not support the underlying 
premise for hypothesis #2 that dealers systematically close out their positions (increased 
liquidity) prior to weekends and holidays.  To make sure that this relationship does not hold as 
suggested by our hypothesis, we extend our analysis to a day-of-the-week test as explained in the 
following section. 
3.5. Liquidity and day-of-the-week effect  
3.5.1 Methodology   
Cross (1973) tests stock returns from 1953 to 1970 to find that Friday returns are higher than 
Monday returns.  Gibbons and Hess (1981) also test stock returns to identify a day-of-the-week 
effect where returns on Monday are lower than returns on other days.  Their research triggered 
off a series of papers looking at the similar trends in stock and other markets using returns, 
volatility and other parameters.  While papers on CDS spreads have included day-of-the-week 
dummies in analysing spread changes, we have not found any that look at day-of-the-week effect 
on liquidity.   
As a further test of hypothesis #2, we run the following regression on each firm in our panel to 
test for day-of-the-week effects.  Based on the expected relationship between liquidity and quote 
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shading, we expect to see a tightening of liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, close to 
the weekend.  
Ch_Liqi,t  = Ch_Liqi,t-1 +  i,1D1 +  i,2D2 +  i,3D3 +  i,4D4 + i,5D5 + i 
Where: 
Ch_Liqi,t  = Change in liquidity (%) on day t for firm i 
D1-5   = Dummy for each day of the week (i.e. dummy is =1 if it is Monday, else it is  
  0) where 1= Monday, 2=Tuesday and so on 
1-5   = Coefficients for each day of the week 
i  = Error term 
The lagged liquidity change term is added to the OLS regression to account for the possibility of 
autocorrelations in the error term.  This regression is run for the firms in our database and the 
results are presented in the following section. 
3.5.2 Results  
Table 3.4 presents a summary of our findings which reflect that on average, liquidity decreases 
throughout the week.  More importantly, it decreases the most on Mondays and Fridays while it 
decreases by the least amount on Tuesdays.  Interestingly, our results are in line with the findings 
from Chordia et al. (2001) where they study the equity markets to find trading activity peaking 
on Tuesdays and at the lowest on Fridays.   
In the case of CDS, this means that traders typically avoid trading or taking up positions close to 
holidays or just after holidays and prefer trading during the week.  While this result does not 
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support our hypothesis #2 that quote shading (increased liquidity) occurs close to holidays, our 
regression results confirm the findings from our quote shading analysis where we find a 
negative, statistically significant relationship between quote shading and weekends.  Based on 
the results from both tests, we can conclude that CDS dealers trade and square their positions 
during the week and then reduce trading activity close to weekend to avoid taking up a position 
just before a holiday. 
3.6. Price discovery and volatility 
3.6.1 Methodology 
Literature on price discovery for the CDS market looks at price efficiency differences amongst 
CDS, stock and equity markets and none of the papers we found has looked at a market while 
focusing on changes in risk.  Martens (1998) looks at price discovery in the bond futures market 
during periods of high volatility and low volatility.  Studying bond futures traded on the London 
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) and Deutsche Terminborse (DTB) he finds 
that during periods of high volatility, share of price discovery in the LIFFE floor trading market 
increases although its trading volume decreases while during quiet periods, the DTB generates a 
higher share of price discovery with a lower transaction volume. 
We draw on his methodology and extend the tests to our dataset.  We separate our data into 
“Quote Shading” (QS) and “No Quote Shading” (NQS) sets based on our findings from Section 
3.4.  Having divided our data into QS and NQS series, we conduct Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests to check the time series for stationarity and find evidence of unit-roots present.  One way of 
accounting for the presence of unit-roots is to take the first difference i.e., use share returns and 
CDS spread changes.  However, the use of first difference results in a loss of information on the 
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long run equilibrium characteristics of the data.  An Error Correction Model (ECM) provides an 
alternative to using first difference for non-stationary data.     
To use the ECM, we first need to identify cointegrated relationships.  We therefore test the data 
for cointegration using the Johansen test.  Although two variables may be non-stationary, if they 
are driven by the same underlying factors they could drift together so that their linear 
combination becomes stationary.  This means that when an I(1) variable is regressed against 
another I(1) variable and the residuals are I(0), the variables are said to be cointegrated.    
While cointegration suggests a long term relationship between the two variables, they are likely 
to deviate from equilibrium in the short term.  When that happens, the variables will eventually 
move to close out the gap between them.  This adjustment in the short term between the two can 
be captured through an ECM as shown below.   
 CDSi,t = 1 + 1(CDSi,t-1 - 0 - 1 Pricei,t-1) + i=1to5 1,i Pricei,t-i + i=1to51,i CDSi,t-i + 1,t 
 Pricei,t = 2 + 2(CDS i,t-1 - 0 - 1 Pricei,t-1) + i=1to5 2,i Price i,t-i + i=1to5 2,i CDS i,t-i + 2,t 
Where 
CDSi,t   = CDS spread for firm i at time t 
Pricei,t   = Share price for firm i at time t 
  =  Regression coefficients 
    i.i.d. shocks 
When the two variables (Price and CDS) are cointegrated the variables 0 = 0 and 1 = 1.  A 
negative and statistically significant value of 1shows the stock market contributes to the price 
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discovery.  If the CDS market is contributing to price discovery, we will find 2 to be positive 
and statistically significant.  In case both markets are contributing to the price discovery process, 
we will find both coefficients to be statistically significant. 
As the purpose of our test is to compare price discovery in two separate regimes, we need a 
measure that allows us to compare price discovery during the two periods.  Hasbrouck (1995, 
2003) argues that given random walk in markets, new information gets reflected through price 
volatility.  Therefore, whichever market contributes more to the variance of innovations is the 
one where price discovery takes place.  However, as the different markets are often correlated, he 
uses an “information share” measure to find out where price discovery occurs, where 
Hasbrouck Lower Limit (HLL) = 
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While we get the 1 and 2 values from our ECM, we also need to compute the values for 1, 2 
and 12 which are the residual variance-covariance values from our ECM.  As the innovations in 
the markets may be correlated, we use Cholesky factorization to arrive at a lower-triangular 
matrix with the variance and covariance.  In terms of the lag, we use data from 5 prior days to 
ensure that the entire week is taken into account.   
3.6.2 Results 
Results are presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6.  In the absence of quote shading there is evidence of 
cointegration in 99 cases with the share market contributing to price discovery in 51 cases and 
the CDS market contributing in 18 cases.  There are 30 firms where both the CDS and stock 
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markets contribute to price discovery.  Using the Hasbrouck Lower Limit as a price discovery 
measure, on average 41.5% of price discovery comes from the CDS market when there is no 
quote shading. 
When we find evidence of quote shading, there are 45 cointegrated firms with the stock market 
contributing to price discovery in 30 instances while the CDS market contributes in 11 cases and 
both in only 4 instances.  Furthermore, there is only 36.7% of price discovery coming, on 
average, from the CDS market.  Looking at the two results, we find that price discovery is better 
when dealers do not adjust quotes. 
In order to highlight the difference in price discovery between QS and NQS periods, we identify 
33 cases where the prices display cointegration in both periods and also have statistically 
significant ECM parameters.   We recognize that while we have 99 cases of cointegration for the 
NQS period and 45 for QS, the number declines drastically when we look for instances where 
cointegration is present in both QS and NQS periods.  A possible reason is that cointegration 
draws on the long term relationship between variables and by splitting our database into 
subperiods, we are losing some information on the long term relationship between CDS spreads 
and share price.   To ensure that our methodology yields correct cointegration results, we test the 
complete dataset for cointegration and find these 33 cases to be cointegrated.    
Comparing the price discovery for QS and NQS data, we find that the CDS market’s average 
contribution to price discovery is 41.8% with quote shading which increases to 46.4% without 
quote shading.  This seems to support our hypothesis that quote shading by dealers reduces the 
informational efficiency in the market. 
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Using the price discovery contributions for the 33 firms, we compare the results for QS and NQS 
and test to see if they are significantly different from each other.  However, we do not find 
statistically significant evidence showing that the NQS price discovery contribution is greater 
than that with QS.  We therefore cannot use our results as conclusive support of hypothesis #3 
and need to use an alternative approach.   
3.6.3 Price discovery and volatility - Alternative Tests 
Given that the price discovery differences between QS and NQS time series are not statistically 
significant, we turn to another set of tests to identify differences in price discovery.  As our 
previous results have shown that quote shading is more likely to occur during higher risk periods, 
we use put-call ratio as a factor to split our dataset into high risk and low risk periods.   
We take a 5-day moving average of the put-call ratio as an indicator treating a score of over 0.8 
as high risk and a score below 0.6 as low risk.  Unlike quote shading as an indicator that changes 
frequently, risk levels are more sticky and do not change as often.  Also, quote shading was 
observed in only 10% of the data points while risk levels are spread out much more evenly.  The 
data can therefore be split along risk levels and provide us with longer stretches of data for 
analysis.   
We find cointegration in 51 cases in the high risk period and 67 cases in low risk (summary 
results in Table 3.7).   For the high risk period, we find the stock market contributing to price 
discovery in 36 cases while CDS contributes in only 7 instances.  There are 8 cases where both 
stock market and CDS contribute to price discovery.  Using the Hasbrouck lower limit as a 
measure of price discovery, we find 32.1% price discovery in the CDS during high risk periods. 
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In the 67 cases of cointegration during low risk, we find that the stock market contributes in 50 
cases and CDS in 11 cases while they both contribute in 6 instances.  The Hasbrouck measure 
shows 36.1% contribution to price discovery from the CDS market in low risk periods. 
The above results represent the summary of all cointegrated firms.  However, our focus is on 
identifying differences between the two and therefore, we need to compare the mean price 
discovery levels for statistical significance.   
We identify 26 cases where the prices display cointegration in both periods and also have 
statistically significant ECM parameters (detailed results in Table 3.8).  As before, we also test 
these 26 firms for cointegration using the full dataset to ensure that no incorrect relationships 
come up due to the splitting of the database.  We find the same firms to be cointegrated when the 
complete dataset is considered. 
While the CDS market’s average contribution to price discovery is 17.25% (median 3%) in 
periods of high risk, it increases to 28.3% (median 17.9%) when risk is low.    When risk is high, 
the CDS market contributed to price discovery in one case and the stock market accounted for 
price discovery in 21 cases while the CDS and stock markets were jointly responsible for price 
discovery in 3 cases.  During low risk periods, the stock market was significant in price 
discovery in 18 instances, with the CDS market in 5 cases and both markets in 2 instances. 
The initial results support Hypothesis #3 that price discovery in the CDS market is lower during 
periods of high risk which is where we find a greater prevalence of quote shading.  However, to 
be certain, we take the series of price discovery levels we computed for high and low risk periods 
and test the difference between the two to find it to be statistically significant.   
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Based on the above, we can conclude that price discovery is slower in the CDS market during 
high risk periods when there is a greater probability of quote shading. Therefore, if the true 
market spreads should be decreasing, dealers could be putting upward pressure on quotes to 
encourage investors to sell cover.  This would adversely impact price discovery during high risk 
periods.  While this practice of quote shading, i.e. adjusting quotes to modify investor behaviour, 
could be reducing market informational efficiency, it is equally likely that the OTC CDS market 
simply breaks down during high risk periods and pricing efficiency drops.  Without more 
detailed data, it is difficult to identify the exact driver behind these results.   
 
3.6.4 Liquidity and volatility - An alternative explanation 
Since liquidity can have a direct impact on price discovery, a case can also be made for a 
liquidity based explanation for the change in price discovery between low and high risk periods.  
If liquidity increases in the CDS market when risk is low and decreases during high risk periods, 
it could be argued that changes in liquidity are driving our test results.   
To confirm that liquidity is not the reason for our results, we extend our analysis to test for a 
relationship between liquidity changes and changing volatility levels by running the following 
regression: 
Ch_Liqi,t = i + i Ch_Volatilityi,t-1 + i 
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Where: 
Ch_Liqi,t  = % change in % liquidity on day t from day t-1 for firm i. 
Ch_Voli,t  = % change in risk (using put-call ratio) on day t from day t-1 for firm i. 
ii  = Regression coefficients  
i   = Error term 
Our regression results (Table 3.9) reflect volatility change coefficients that are statistically 
significant in only 15 cases out of 198 while the constant remains significant for all firms, 
suggesting omitted factors.  We therefore fail to establish a relationship between changes in CDS 
market liquidity and firm risk level for our dataset.  These findings therefore support our results 
that price discovery is impacted by the risk level in the market and is independent of liquidity 
changes in the markets.                         
3.7. Conclusion 
The OTC market for CDS is currently going through a period of great scrutiny with demands for 
regulatory reforms.  Despite a growing stream of literature on this market, there is no published 
research that analyses dealers and their position/inventory management strategies.  Drawing from 
literature on the foreign exchange markets, we know that sell side dealers are likely to cover their 
short positions either through getting into a long position at the market ask rate or by making the 
bid quotes attractive to investors i.e. quote shading. 
Using changes in bid and ask rates, we find evidence of quote shading being carried out to cover 
short positions.  Further, our initial analysis shows that traders prefer providing liquidity to the 
market during the week and tighten liquidity close to holidays or just after holidays.   
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We test price discovery with and without quote shading but do not find a statistically significant 
explanation for the changes.  Instead, using the put-call ratio as a signal of market expectation of 
firm risk going forward, we look at the price discovery process to identify differences when 
market risk levels are high and low since there is a positive relationship between riskiness and 
quote shading.   
Our findings show that most of the price discovery occurs primarily in the stock market.  
However, the contribution of CDS to the price discovery process in low volatility times is greater 
than during high risk periods.   
We also look at liquidity levels and risk expectation to test if liquidity changes are driving the 
difference in price discovery process but find no evidence to support this premise.  Given the fact 
that dealers indulge in quote shading to cover their positions especially during high risk periods, 
we conclude that this behaviour is actually detrimental to the price discovery process and results 
in lower price discovery taking place in a higher risk CDS market.  This paper establishes the 
need to extend this analysis using more detailed information to improve our understanding of 
how CDS dealers behave and the impact their quote strategy has on price discovery. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary statistics on CDS, Shares and Put-call ratios (average spreads and returns) 
Firm CDS spread Share Return Put-Call Ratio 
Alcoa 149 -17.25% 0.79 
Amerisourcebergen 67 9.79% 2.16 
Abbott Laboratories 30 1.68% 0.82 
Archer-Danls.-Midl. 47 6.76% 0.78 
Amer.Elec.Pwr. 44 -2.42% 1.28 
AES 352 -0.74% 1.76 
Aetna 49 -3.36% 1.07 
Allergan 37 7.22% 1.36 
American Intl.Gp. 351 -53.23% 1.16 
AK Steel Hldg. 421 3.42% 0.83 
Allstate 68 -10.75% 1.06 
Advanced Micro Devc. 934 -27.27% 0.88 
Amgen 39 -3.68% 0.91 
American Tower 'A' 162 15.76% 1.60 
Apache 44 14.82% 0.77 
Anadarko Petroleum 72 14.97% 0.87 
Avalonbay Commns. 131 -1.61% 4.29 
Avon Products 34 -3.56% 1.92 
American Express 116 -6.79% 1.12 
Allegheny En. 151 3.46% 4.25 
Autozone 75 8.62% 1.56 
Bank Of America 69 -21.33% 0.91 
Baxter Intl. 24 9.67% 1.08 
Baker Hughes 36 0.36% 1.04 
Ball 152 2.70% 3.56 
Bristol Myers Squibb 26 -3.14% 0.78 
Boston Scientific 113 -25.79% 1.27 
Peabody Energy 210 17.59% 0.83 
Boston Properties 155 -0.95% 2.57 
Citigroup 108 -40.01% 0.96 
CA 131 -7.71% 1.94 
Cardinal Health 46 -7.39% 1.58 
Caterpillar 62 3.09% 1.06 
Chubb 40 5.10% 1.23 
Carnival 91 -13.08% 2.10 
Chesapeake Energy 271 9.99% 0.52 
Cigna 74 0.89% 1.31 
Colgate-Palm. 27 9.82% 1.33 
Clorox 41 0.31% 1.57 
Comcast 'A' 78 -8.19% 1.33 
Cummins 90 16.51% 1.46 
CMS Energy 182 5.24% 2.75 
Centerpoint En. 104 2.74% 2.01 
Costco Wholesale 36 3.61% 1.33 
Campbell Soup 25 1.38% 2.82 
Computer Scis. 64 -1.88% 1.69 
CSX 68 16.82% 1.23 
Chevron 29 8.81% 0.82 
Dominion Res. 46 0.21% 1.17 
E I Du Pont De Nemours 40 -8.60% 0.91 
Deere 47 4.71% 1.11 
Dell 55 -19.74% 1.19 
Dean Foods New 264 -8.12% 4.02 
D R Horton 234 -18.54% 1.96 
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Danaher 40 4.09% 1.33 
Walt Disney 37 -0.08% 0.85 
Dover 41 -1.82% 2.55 
Dow Chemical 96 -14.29% 0.83 
Darden Restaurants 100 2.25% 2.82 
Duke Energy 39 1.70% 0.73 
Devon Energy 44 12.14% 0.78 
Conoco Phillips 38 3.72% 0.74 
Eastman Kodak 447 -36.04% 2.01 
Eastman Chemical 64 -1.79% 1.66 
Emerson Electric 41 1.97% 0.70 
El Paso 326 -0.70% 0.85 
Eaton 66 -3.31% 1.40 
Entergy 142 3.02% 2.13 
Exelon 107 1.73% 0.87 
Ford Motor 1,516 -14.25% 1.40 
Fedex 67 -5.88% 1.26 
First Energy 68 1.99% 1.67 
Fortune Brands 95 -11.91% 2.04 
Gannett 260 -35.43% 2.65 
General Dynamics 30 4.36% 0.93 
General Mills 39 6.38% 1.10 
Corning 83 4.69% 0.64 
Genworth Financial 463 -17.62% 3.27 
Gap 91 0.36% 1.63 
Goodrich 46 11.45% 1.88 
Goldman Sachs Gp. 92 10.52% 0.91 
Goodyear Tire & Rub. 454 -2.97% 1.63 
Halliburton 38 9.30% 0.89 
Hasbro 69 7.65% 2.63 
Health Care Reit 193 3.75% 1.32 
Home Depot 73 -10.60% 0.94 
Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp. 166 -19.23% 1.60 
HJ Heinz 44 0.82% 2.70 
Honeywell Intl. 34 0.34% 0.81 
Starwood Htls.& Rsts. Worldwide 215 -9.15% 1.68 
H&R Block 92 -5.70% 2.48 
The Hershey Company 35 -7.25% 1.04 
Humana 115 5.39% 1.16 
International Bus.Mchs. 33 4.45% 1.01 
Intl.Game Tech. 99 -12.42% 0.98 
Intl.Paper 149 -12.28% 1.10 
Interpublic Gp. 488 -15.33% 10.49 
Johnson Controls 124 2.80% 1.66 
Penney JC 156 -4.52% 1.46 
Johnson & Johnson 18 -1.30% 0.93 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 57 1.35% 1.05 
Nordstrom 113 6.73% 1.35 
Kellogg 34 3.15% 2.25 
Kraft Foods 49 -4.79% 1.98 
Kimco Realty 184 -15.64% 2.12 
Kimberly-Clark 32 -1.11% 1.27 
Coca Cola 27 5.30% 0.73 
Kroger 62 6.39% 1.54 
Kohl's 80 3.15% 1.59 
Lennar 'A' 294 -26.57% 1.66 
Eli Lilly 21 -9.89% 1.32 
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Lockheed Martin 29 5.06% 1.05 
Lincoln Nat. 216 -12.77% 1.17 
Southwest Airlines 106 -12.57% 1.05 
Marriott Intl.'A' 128 -4.33% 2.02 
Masco 164 -20.95% 8.84 
Mattel 71 -0.26% 1.52 
McDonalds 28 13.48% 0.83 
McKesson 40 14.09% 1.44 
Medtronic 40 -6.52% 0.83 
Massey En. 392 -3.02% 1.32 
Metlife 154 -3.37% 1.67 
Medco Health Sltn. 74 22.84% 1.11 
Marsh & Mclennan 60 -6.76% 1.28 
3M 28 -2.32% 1.32 
Altria Group 69 5.43% 0.72 
Motorola 135 -13.28% 0.77 
Merck & Co. 27 -0.22% 0.99 
Marathon Oil 85 12.26% 0.71 
Meadwestvaco 100 -7.62% 1.67 
Nabors Inds. 82 -3.28% 0.82 
Newmont Mining 83 0.53% 0.72 
Nike 'B' 31 6.75% 1.20 
Northrop Grumman 33 -1.40% 1.07 
Norfolk Southern 42 5.79% 0.99 
Northeast Utilities 51 4.66% 1.23 
Nucor 48 9.93% 1.08 
Newell Rubbermaid 78 -9.91% 1.93 
Office Depot 372 -19.45% 1.63 
Owens Illinois New 302 7.30% 2.18 
Oneok 73 5.57% 0.86 
Omnicom Gp. 67 -4.26% 2.15 
Occidental Ptl. 40 22.67% 0.81 
Pitney-Bowes 42 -12.15% 3.19 
PepsiCo 28 3.23% 0.89 
Pfizer 26 -8.71% 0.81 
Procter & Gamble 37 1.03% 0.94 
Pulte Group 187 -22.89% 2.37 
Prologis 336 -23.98% 2.46 
Pepco Holdings 97 -6.63% 1.06 
PPG Industries 65 -3.57% 1.25 
Praxair 38 13.02% 1.08 
Qwest Comms.Intl. 291 -3.99% 0.97 
Ryder System 101 -2.89% 3.71 
Republic Svs.'A' 56 3.30% 1.37 
Radioshack 153 -12.78% 3.21 
Raytheon 'B' 35 3.67% 0.69 
Sealed Air 108 -6.68% 5.03 
Sherwin-Williams 57 5.46% 4.28 
Sara Lee 52 -11.55% 1.05 
SLM 370 -30.09% 2.28 
Simon Pr.Gp. 141 1.25% 1.95 
Staples 91 -0.19% 1.47 
Sempra En. 51 7.49% 1.51 
Sunoco 114 -4.67% 1.06 
Supervalu 186 -14.41% 2.94 
Safeway 64 2.76% 1.83 
AT&T 38 0.06% 0.87 
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Teco Energy 116 -1.25% 1.74 
Target 52 -1.38% 1.16 
Tenet Hlthcr. 579 -14.17% 2.18 
Tjx Cos. 48 8.80% 2.85 
Tyson Foods 'A' 154 -7.25% 3.06 
Tesoro 227 -1.12% 0.79 
Time Warner 74 -7.12% 0.75 
Textron 176 -13.67% 1.34 
United Health Gp. 87 -10.06% 0.89 
Unum Group 150 2.73% 2.43 
Union Pacific 48 10.72% 1.29 
United Parcel Ser. 29 -9.08% 0.85 
United Technologies 36 3.72% 0.86 
V F 50 5.66% 4.14 
Valero Energy 100 -3.53% 0.70 
Vornado Realty Tst. 179 -4.92% 3.84 
Wisconsin Energy 49 5.51% 0.82 
Wells Fargo & Co 58 -2.41% 2.21 
Whirlpool 118 0.75% 2.18 
Wellpoint 87 -3.75% 1.36 
Williams Cos. 138 4.09% 0.73 
Wal Mart Stores 31 -1.46% 0.96 
Weyerhaeuser 111 -11.90% 1.15 
US.Steel 257 -7.13% 1.12 
Xcel Energy 52 0.95% 1.18 
Xl Cap.'A' 207 -27.29% 3.40 
Exxon Mobil 20 7.70% 0.80 
Xerox 157 -15.51% 1.14 
XTO En. 82 17.54% 0.70 
Yum! Brands 67 7.33% 1.36 
Overall Average 107 2.20% 1.63 
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Table 3.2 
Summary of Quote Shading (QS) Results 
Firm QS days High Risk days Holidays QS days when high risk or holiday 
Alcoa 175 425 252 105 
Amerisourcebergen 106 746 252 79 
Abbott Laboratories 94 461 252 60 
Archer-Danls.-Midl. 141 418 252 77 
Amer.Elec.Pwr. 111 518 252 78 
AES 143 439 252 86 
Aetna 123 575 252 76 
Allergan 106 632 252 69 
American Intl.Gp. 133 656 252 94 
AK Steel Hldg. 109 404 252 66 
Allstate 134 524 252 79 
Advanced Micro Devc. 115 465 252 74 
Amgen 124 495 252 65 
American Tower 'A' 31 564 252 17 
Apache 107 468 252 66 
Anadarko Petroleum 129 545 252 91 
Avalonbay Commns. 134 781 252 105 
Avon Products 99 729 252 71 
American Express 135 648 252 105 
Allegheny En. 168 481 252 107 
Autozone 110 953 252 93 
Bank Of America 115 593 252 80 
Baxter Intl. 107 546 252 68 
Baker Hughes 120 589 252 79 
Ball 32 562 252 17 
Bristol Myers Squibb 123 418 252 69 
Boston Scientific 147 529 252 93 
Peabody Energy 125 518 252 84 
Boston Properties 128 687 252 88 
Citigroup 127 592 252 88 
CA 152 597 252 101 
Cardinal Health 111 667 252 81 
Caterpillar 146 765 252 111 
Chubb 89 594 252 62 
Carnival 155 843 252 110 
Chesapeake Energy 150 212 252 71 
Cigna 127 639 252 80 
Colgate-Palm. 80 651 252 59 
Clorox 129 564 252 80 
Comcast 'A' 80 599 252 53 
Cummins 138 741 252 110 
CMS Energy 159 497 252 99 
Centerpoint En. 140 430 252 86 
Costco Wholesale 81 787 252 68 
Campbell Soup 103 558 252 68 
Computer Scis. 122 576 252 77 
CSX 135 457 252 83 
Chevron 119 550 252 79 
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Dominion Res. 111 532 252 67 
E I Du Pont De Nemours 124 541 252 87 
Deere 146 677 252 104 
Dell 102 639 252 68 
Dean Foods New 135 562 252 90 
D R Horton 153 797 252 112 
Danaher 108 657 252 77 
Walt Disney 117 504 252 66 
Dover 81 513 252 58 
Dow Chemical 148 467 252 95 
Darden Restaurants 144 711 252 105 
Duke Energy 101 331 252 45 
Devon Energy 124 471 252 77 
Conoco Phillips 121 448 252 66 
Eastman Kodak 148 680 252 103 
Eastman Chemical 150 628 252 111 
Emerson Electric 81 377 252 44 
El Paso 128 360 252 68 
Eaton 117 632 252 83 
Entergy 148 586 252 96 
Exelon 139 459 252 91 
Ford Motor 152 628 252 106 
Fedex 156 817 252 124 
First Energy 129 433 252 70 
Fortune Brands 130 547 252 77 
Gannett 130 625 252 87 
General Dynamics 136 537 252 96 
General Mills 93 506 252 48 
Corning 112 312 252 58 
Genworth Financial 151 423 252 93 
Gap 135 597 252 100 
Goodrich 122 457 252 74 
Goldman Sachs Gp. 120 740 252 86 
Goodyear Tire & Rub. 138 598 252 91 
Halliburton 114 560 252 79 
Hasbro 123 544 252 78 
Health Care Reit 117 708 252 80 
Home Depot 138 608 252 98 
Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp. 138 622 252 103 
HJ Heinz 93 592 252 63 
Honeywell Intl. 121 468 252 72 
Starwood Htls.& Rsts. Worldwide 144 703 252 122 
H&R Block 114 806 252 89 
The Hershey Company 79 532 252 47 
Humana 136 574 252 91 
International Bus.Mchs. 106 750 252 83 
Intl.Game Tech. 87 474 252 47 
Intl.Paper 155 567 252 106 
Interpublic Gp. 157 639 252 114 
Johnson Controls 128 630 252 99 
Penney JC 135 741 252 102 
Johnson & Johnson 101 537 252 61 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 123 770 252 95 
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Nordstrom 127 655 252 88 
Kellogg 118 595 252 71 
Kraft Foods 119 640 252 76 
Kimco Realty 143 644 252 100 
Kimberly-Clark 109 607 252 71 
Coca Cola 107 401 252 58 
Kroger 115 534 252 80 
Kohl's 128 825 252 109 
Lennar 'A' 160 789 252 123 
Eli Lilly 120 629 252 86 
Lockheed Martin 121 611 252 90 
Lincoln Nat. 128 504 252 93 
Southwest Airlines 179 454 252 103 
Marriott Intl.'A' 139 677 252 106 
Masco 132 766 252 107 
Mattel 112 583 252 84 
McDonalds 99 519 252 60 
McKesson 104 560 252 69 
Medtronic 135 475 252 72 
Massey En. 133 590 252 89 
Metlife 149 669 252 107 
Medco Health Sltn. 105 562 252 67 
Marsh & McLennan 105 506 252 69 
3M 93 709 252 67 
Altria Group 129 404 252 72 
Motorola 152 400 252 86 
Merck & Co. 127 580 252 87 
Marathon Oil 120 390 252 58 
Meadwestvaco 132 670 252 95 
Nabors Inds. 134 409 252 76 
Newmont Mining 144 379 252 86 
Nike 'B' 10 718 252 7 
Northrop Grumman 116 509 252 67 
Norfolk Southern 129 493 252 72 
Northeast Utilities 63 697 252 41 
Nucor 128 687 252 87 
Newell Rubbermaid 137 505 252 82 
Office Depot 94 513 252 64 
Owens Illinois New 134 511 252 87 
Oneok 113 342 252 64 
Omnicom Gp. 134 741 252 100 
Occidental Ptl. 119 480 252 66 
Pitney-Bowes 105 535 252 64 
PepsiCo 83 505 252 64 
Pfizer 93 475 252 54 
Procter & Gamble 103 581 252 71 
Pultegroup 153 885 252 128 
Prologis 140 585 252 79 
Pepco Holdings 121 432 252 75 
PPG Industries 133 540 252 85 
Praxair 116 455 252 72 
Qwest Comms.Intl. 52 297 252 31 
Ryder System 148 713 252 110 
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Republic Svs.'A' 85 523 252 54 
Radioshack 172 770 252 132 
Raytheon 'B' 137 358 252 75 
Sealed Air 115 653 252 78 
Sherwin-Williams 131 855 252 108 
Sara Lee 104 398 252 71 
SLM 143 675 252 102 
Simon Pr.Gp. 146 930 252 119 
Staples 134 565 252 94 
Sempra En. 119 459 252 68 
Sunoco 151 618 252 96 
Supervalu 145 562 252 102 
Safeway 119 594 252 84 
AT&T 132 437 252 90 
Teco Energy 150 457 252 80 
Target 121 737 252 94 
Tenet Hlthcr. 119 532 252 83 
TJX Cos. 83 520 252 54 
Tyson Foods 'A' 137 647 252 93 
Tesoro 136 412 252 76 
Time Warner 142 401 252 73 
Textron 152 534 252 83 
UnitedHealth Gp. 125 443 252 67 
Unum Group 127 564 252 88 
Union Pacific 136 671 252 95 
United Parcel Ser. 103 483 252 65 
United Technologies 129 550 252 91 
V F 103 568 252 63 
Valero Energy 135 348 252 89 
Vornado Realty Tst. 156 754 252 120 
Wisconsin Energy 81 730 252 53 
Wells Fargo & Co 114 948 252 100 
Whirlpool 149 946 252 123 
Wellpoint 107 636 252 65 
Williams Cos. 133 360 252 86 
Wal Mart Stores 100 601 252 62 
Weyerhaeuser 168 599 252 104 
US.Steel 82 673 252 57 
Xcel Energy 110 307 252 64 
XL Cap.'A' 136 756 252 102 
Exxon Mobil 140 538 252 92 
Xerox 184 442 252 118 
XTO En. 126 378 252 70 
Yum! Brands 119 659 252 81 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation between Quote Shading, Risk Levels and Holidays  
Quote shading and bearish outlook 
 
Correlation 0.0048 
p-stat 0.0164 
  
Quote shading and holidays 
 
Correlation - 0.01 
p-stat 0.00 
 
Table 3.4 
Regression of Liquidity and Day of Week 
 
Mean Median Significant relationship 
Lag term -32.70% -34.02% 195 
Monday 5.73% 4.79% 124 
Tuesday 4.88% 4.57% 91 
Wednesday 5.37% 4.69% 128 
Thursday 5.43% 5.22% 136 
Friday 5.89% 5.66% 151 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Price Discovery Results for Quote Shading and No-quote Shading  
 
Number of firms where (%) 
 
CDS market 
contributes 
Stock market 
contributes 
Both markets 
contribute 
Mean CDS 
discovery 
Median CDS 
discovery 
Quote Shading 11 30 4 36.7% 30.7% 
No Quote Shading 18 51 30 41.5% 33% 
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Table 3.6 
Results from ECM and Hasbrouck Information Share (for no-quote shading and quote shading periods) 
 
No Quote Shading Quote Shading 
 
1 1 t-stat 2 2 t-stat 
Hasbrouck - 
Lower Limit 
Hasbrouck - 
Upper Limit 
1 1 t-stat 2 2 t-stat 
Hasbrouck - 
Lower Limit 
Hasbrouck - 
Upper Limit 
Amerisourcebergen -2.1386 -2.3900 0.1256 1.1083 0.1694 0.2280 -0.3320 -3.0622 -0.0095 -0.9991 0.0955 0.1083 
Apache -7.8220 -3.7535 3.2068 2.5135 0.3400 0.3713 -0.2612 -3.1250 0.0449 0.6611 0.0219 0.0453 
CA -4.2094 -1.7872 -0.0739 -0.5999 0.1229 0.1377 0.1588 0.8122 0.0239 1.8094 0.8197 0.8396 
Chubb -2.6273 -1.8574 0.7627 2.5019 0.7257 0.8236 0.0235 0.1929 0.0873 3.0145 0.9879 0.9961 
CMS Energy 1.0616 0.5398 0.1434 2.8052 0.9654 0.9748 0.5025 2.0860 0.0177 2.6912 0.6195 0.6503 
Campbell Soup -0.3626 -0.7444 0.5518 3.0754 0.9497 0.9846 -0.0756 -1.7529 -0.0368 -2.8228 0.6937 0.7336 
Computer Scis. -3.5443 -3.2342 -0.5267 -2.2252 0.3218 0.3376 -0.6990 -3.9328 -0.0089 -0.3164 0.0027 0.0067 
CSX -3.6426 -3.2751 -0.3057 -0.9062 0.0744 0.0873 -0.4461 -3.8969 -0.0137 -0.4374 0.0130 0.0328 
Dominion Res. -0.5928 -0.9684 -0.5365 -1.9645 0.7571 0.8607 -0.1657 -2.0800 -0.0384 -2.3657 0.5392 0.5917 
Darden Restaurants -4.8091 -2.4442 0.6128 3.7166 0.8296 0.8667 0.4052 2.2537 0.0499 1.8983 0.4163 0.4715 
Duke Energy 0.7010 0.2537 0.3056 1.9288 0.9766 0.9850 -0.0795 -1.2494 -0.0197 -2.8403 0.7934 0.8506 
Entergy -3.0411 -1.7182 1.1469 3.3874 0.8053 0.8168 -0.3322 -1.7462 -0.0680 -1.4601 0.4071 0.4311 
Ford Motor -229.7377 -3.4522 0.0602 1.1530 0.1080 0.1083 22.1878 2.7699 0.0143 2.2208 0.3980 0.3986 
General Dynamics -1.1788 -2.9370 -0.3832 -0.9059 0.0978 0.1884 -0.1312 -2.2278 -0.0361 -1.0856 0.1821 0.2566 
Gap -3.1141 -3.4872 0.2898 2.5260 0.3489 0.3952 -0.4131 -3.1251 -0.0150 -1.3051 0.1485 0.1822 
Kellogg -1.6602 -2.9984 0.0541 0.4075 0.0085 0.0193 -0.0696 -1.2517 0.0419 2.5704 0.8032 0.8346 
Kimco Realty -12.4208 -1.8986 -0.6212 -2.4611 0.6952 0.7040 -0.7690 -2.1759 -0.0306 -1.1896 0.2368 0.2552 
Kimberly-Clark -1.2889 -2.2385 0.6341 2.7651 0.6773 0.8116 -0.0694 -1.2939 0.0723 3.4215 0.8712 0.9316 
Lincoln Nat. -37.8693 -2.1207 -0.0348 -0.0881 0.0023 0.0026 -5.6115 -4.0434 -0.0079 -0.2153 0.0030 0.0035 
McKesson -0.7999 -0.5359 2.2704 4.6132 0.9870 0.9907 -0.1918 -2.8398 -0.0523 -1.9749 0.3078 0.3859 
Marsh & McLennan -1.6525 -1.9563 -0.3325 -1.6141 0.3974 0.4133 -0.3369 -3.3696 -0.0120 -0.8193 0.0557 0.0747 
Altria Group -4.2922 -3.9994 0.1300 2.1246 0.2410 0.2928 -0.0845 -0.8879 0.0259 3.1778 0.9274 0.9486 
Meadwestvaco -5.2200 -3.0985 0.1939 0.9736 0.1039 0.1326 -0.3057 -1.8277 0.0483 3.1709 0.7624 0.8170 
Newmont Mining -9.3268 -3.1418 -0.1834 -0.6587 0.0508 0.0581 0.6763 3.5518 0.0724 2.0976 0.2569 0.2714 
Norfolk Southern -1.0370 -1.5393 1.1945 3.8195 0.8621 0.8851 -0.2464 -2.9913 0.0296 0.8415 0.0373 0.0816 
PepsiCo -3.0333 -4.1813 0.5448 1.0989 0.0346 0.0777 -0.0979 -2.1209 0.0456 2.1130 0.4590 0.5476 
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Procter & Gamble -2.0980 -1.7364 0.3535 1.5472 0.4451 0.4716 -0.1216 -2.4967 0.0463 2.0306 0.3733 0.4169 
Staples 2.7327 0.9859 -0.3539 -3.1361 0.9339 0.9446 0.0860 0.4586 0.0489 3.4482 0.9736 0.9836 
Sempra En. -2.6206 -3.0267 0.3963 1.4729 0.1846 0.2279 -0.1209 -1.1295 -0.0468 -1.9458 0.7021 0.7932 
Safeway 0.9794 1.3994 -0.6056 -3.3440 0.8579 0.8968 -0.2508 -2.8102 -0.0355 -2.3084 0.3877 0.4401 
AT&T -1.7436 -2.5555 0.3339 2.1309 0.4125 0.4745 -0.4405 -4.3678 -0.0109 -0.7327 0.0273 0.0352 
Union Pacific -1.5957 -1.6658 -0.2060 -0.7119 0.2112 0.2972 -0.2860 -3.3449 0.0050 0.1311 0.0018 0.0084 
United Parcel Ser. -2.9375 -2.0546 0.6782 2.3987 0.6030 0.6406 -0.1551 -2.2810 -0.0758 -2.5459 0.5114 0.6104 
Vornado Realty Tst. -10.3775 -2.4708 -0.1968 -0.4942 0.0797 0.0924 -0.4322 -1.1555 -0.1418 -2.0732 0.7639 0.7865 
Wells Fargo & Co 0.2997 0.1646 0.5731 3.2734 0.9950 0.9979 0.5882 2.8191 0.0172 0.6368 0.0586 0.0985 
XTO En. -11.9600 -4.4221 0.9315 2.5949 0.3403 0.3723 -0.3099 -2.0078 0.0564 1.6611 0.3937 0.4336 
Mean     
46.4% 49.9% 
    
41.8% 45.4% 
Median     
37.3% 40.4% 
    
39.6% 43.2% 
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Table 3.7 
Price Discovery Results for High and Low Risk Periods 
 
Number of firms where (%) 
 
CDS market 
contributes 
Stock market 
contributes 
Both markets 
contribute 
Mean CDS 
discovery 
Median CDS 
discovery 
High Risk 7 36 8 32.1% 18.1% 
Low Risk 11 50 6 36.1% 30.9% 
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Table 3.8 
Results from ECM and Hasbrouck Information Share (for high risk and low risk periods) 
 
High Risk Low Risk 
 
1 1 tstat 2 tstat 
Hasbrouck - 
Lower Limit 
Hasbrouck - 
Upper Limit 1 1 tstat 2 2 tstat 
Hasbrouck - 
Lower Limit 
Hasbrouck - 
Upper Limit 
Amerisourcebergen 
-0.3550 -2.7485 -0.0151 -1.2406 0.1673 0.2018 -0.8338 -2.2589 -0.0368 -1.4293      0.2985       0.3490  
American Intl.Gp. 
-26.9827 -6.4223 0.9346 0.7891 0.0155 0.0163 -22.0262 -4.0607 0.5251 0.5808      0.0201       0.0203  
Chubb 
-0.6435 -2.5047 -0.0269 -0.5987 0.0580 0.0858 0.1943 0.7655 0.1407 3.0543      0.9274       0.9446  
CMS Energy 
0.8248 1.5882 0.0385 2.6413 0.7428 0.7743 0.4543 1.1077 0.0288 2.6913      0.8520       0.8805  
Campbell Soup 
-0.1034 -1.4252 -0.0707 -3.2126 0.8082 0.8420 -0.1548 -1.8253 -0.0712 -2.8005      0.6179       0.7609  
Computer Scis. 
-1.0589 -3.6471 -0.0221 -0.4712 0.0146 0.0165 -1.2818 -3.8544 -0.0173 -0.3583      0.0053       0.0089  
CSX 
-1.5042 -3.8567 -0.0550 -0.6303 0.0282 0.0441 -0.6448 -4.0290 -0.0009 -0.0230      0.0000       0.0081  
Devon Energy 
-1.8459 -4.5350 0.0969 0.4065 0.0026 0.0085 -0.2262 -2.6216 -0.0101 -0.1469      0.0032       0.0175  
Entergy 
-0.7035 -2.3850 -0.0068 -0.0948 0.0016 0.0046 -0.8488 -2.0783 -0.1201 -1.3654      0.3005       0.3082  
Ford Motor 
-27.0531 -3.7918 0.0417 3.6705 0.5696 0.5732 49.3996 2.9700 0.0256 2.3125      0.3825       0.3828  
Gap 
-0.6931 -3.0872 -0.0191 -0.9665 0.0912 0.1157 -1.0058 -3.6775 0.0208 0.9475      0.0470       0.0698  
Interpublic Gp. 
-9.7043 -3.9393 -0.0036 -0.4572 0.0133 0.0134 -24.6010 -3.9392 -0.0093 -0.5201      0.0172       0.0172  
Lincoln Nat. 
-18.6930 -4.5573 0.0408 0.5052 0.0128 0.0137 -13.3579 -5.2210 0.0000 0.0004      0.0000       0.0000  
McKesson 
-0.6834 -4.6954 -0.0473 -0.8624 0.0335 0.0641 -0.3138 -2.5653 -0.0727 -1.5291      0.2543       0.3223  
Marsh & McLennan 
-0.6242 -2.9836 -0.0479 -1.5728 0.2153 0.2366 -0.4926 -3.2614 -0.0276 -1.1132      0.1039       0.1286  
Merck & Co. 
-0.2051 -1.7779 -0.1519 -2.8396 0.6668 0.7515 -0.1432 -1.7525 -0.0572 -1.8437      0.4725       0.6132  
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Meadwestvaco 
-1.1513 -3.6074 0.0897 2.4051 0.3202 0.3969 -0.3245 -1.2732 0.0706 3.0307      0.8670       0.9081  
Newmont Mining 
-12.4008 -3.2948 0.0655 0.4174 0.0154 0.0171 0.5017 2.9355 0.0880 2.4121      0.4003       0.4085  
Newell Rubbermaid 
-1.0142 -3.6139 -0.0098 -0.3984 0.0144 0.0364 -0.9182 -3.6635 -0.0071 -0.3476      0.0095       0.0194  
PepsiCo 
-0.3600 -2.5558 -0.0335 -0.5194 0.0405 0.0944 -0.1898 -2.7114 0.0588 2.1030      0.3185       0.4357  
Procter & Gamble 
-0.6456 -3.4232 0.1073 1.8418 0.1942 0.2461 -0.2074 -2.7390 0.0700 2.4485      0.4146       0.4764  
Radioshack 
-0.7948 -2.9297 -0.0032 -0.1612 0.0034 0.0102 -2.7359 -2.4538 0.0191 0.2803      0.0104       0.0189  
Sempra En. 
-0.6362 -2.6538 0.0775 1.4475 0.2101 0.2850 -0.2081 -1.1169 -0.0539 -1.5705      0.6461       0.7327  
AT&T 
-2.0347 -6.2896 -0.0213 -0.2827 0.0023 0.0140 -0.6216 -4.6372 -0.0162 -0.9167      0.0375       0.0434  
Union Pacific 
-0.6103 -3.5653 0.0007 0.0115 0.0000 0.0090 -0.5350 -2.9980 0.0157 0.2236      0.0025       0.0073  
XTO En. 
-3.6959 -4.3207 0.1194 0.5963 0.0117 0.0252 -0.4498 -2.5554 0.0283 0.7516      0.0623       0.0869  
Mean     
16.4% 18.8% 
    
27.2% 30.7 
Median     
3.1% 5.4% 
    
17.9 21.8 
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Table 3.9 
Regression of Liquidity and Risk Levels 
 
  - t_stat   - t_stat adj R-square 
Alcoa 0.05 4.83 -0.01 -1.15 0.00 
Amerisourcebergen 0.03 3.49 0.00 0.42 -0.00 
Abbott Laboratories 0.02 3.60 -0.00 -1.82 0.00 
Archer-Danls.-Midl. 0.03 3.61 -0.00 -1.05 0.00 
Amer.Elec.Pwr. 0.03 3.50 0.00 0.03 -0.00 
AES 0.03 3.76 -0.00 -0.14 -0.00 
Aetna 0.02 3.30 -0.00 -0.62 -0.00 
Allergan 0.03 3.79 -0.00 -1.40 0.00 
American Intl.Gp. 0.04 4.43 -0.00 -0.60 -0.00 
AK Steel Hldg. 0.03 4.01 -0.00 -0.45 -0.00 
Allstate 0.03 3.87 -0.00 -0.29 -0.00 
Advanced Micro Devc. 0.03 3.67 -0.00 -1.99 0.00 
Amgen 0.03 4.18 -0.01 -1.63 0.00 
American Tower 'A' 0.02 2.83 0.00 0.08 -0.00 
Apache 0.03 3.53 -0.00 -1.51 0.00 
Anadarko Petroleum 0.03 3.49 0.00 0.25 -0.00 
Avalonbay Commns. 0.02 2.74 -0.00 -1.33 0.00 
Avon Products 0.03 3.95 -0.00 -0.45 -0.00 
American Express 0.03 4.00 -0.00 -0.38 -0.00 
Allegheny En. 0.06 5.23 0.00 0.47 -0.00 
Autozone 0.04 3.88 0.00 0.55 -0.00 
Bank Of America 0.03 3.88 -0.00 -0.27 -0.00 
Baxter Intl. 0.02 3.25 -0.00 -0.19 -0.00 
Baker Hughes 0.02 3.32 0.00 0.14 -0.00 
Ball 0.03 2.47 -0.00 -0.38 -0.00 
Bristol Myers Squibb 0.02 3.16 0.00 0.38 -0.00 
Boston Scientific 0.03 3.49 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Peabody Energy 0.38 4.09 0.01 0.18 -0.00 
Boston Properties 0.03 3.68 0.00 0.17 -0.00 
Citigroup 0.05 4.55 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
CA 0.05 4.35 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
Cardinal Health 0.02 3.52 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 
Caterpillar 0.03 3.81 0.00 0.13 -0.00 
Chubb 0.02 3.31 -0.00 -0.75 -0.00 
Carnival 0.04 4.14 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
Chesapeake Energy 0.13 4.45 -0.00 -0.17 -0.00 
Cigna 0.02 2.78 -0.00 -0.80 -0.00 
Colgate-Palm. 0.03 3.42 -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 
Clorox 0.04 4.33 -0.00 -0.83 -0.00 
Comcast 'A' 0.01 2.15 -0.00 -0.29 -0.00 
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Cummins 0.03 4.15 0.00 0.43 -0.00 
CMS Energy 0.04 3.07 -0.00 -0.34 -0.00 
Centerpoint En. 0.03 3.69 -0.00 -0.31 -0.00 
Costco Wholesale 0.02 2.59 -0.00 -0.23 -0.00 
Campbell Soup 0.03 3.54 -0.00 -1.58 0.00 
Computer Scis. 0.04 3.70 0.00 1.72 0.00 
CSX 0.03 4.10 0.00 0.35 -0.00 
Chevron 0.03 3.55 -0.00 -0.05 -0.00 
Dominion Res. 0.02 3.67 -0.00 -0.48 -0.00 
E I Du Pont De Nemours 0.03 3.27 0.00 0.02 -0.00 
Deere 0.04 3.57 0.00 0.17 -0.00 
Dell 0.02 2.91 -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 
Dean Foods New 0.06 2.36 -0.00 -0.28 -0.00 
D R Horton 0.05 3.99 -0.00 -0.89 -0.00 
Danaher 0.03 3.72 0.00 0.26 -0.00 
Walt Disney 0.04 3.72 -0.00 -0.08 -0.00 
Dover 0.02 2.49 0.00 0.58 -0.00 
Dow Chemical 0.03 3.48 0.00 0.24 -0.00 
Darden Restaurants 0.04 3.85 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 
Duke Energy 0.02 3.00 0.00 0.79 -0.00 
Devon Energy 0.03 4.13 -0.00 -0.98 -0.00 
Conoco Phillips 0.03 3.28 0.00 2.03 0.00 
Eastman Kodak 0.04 4.51 -0.00 -0.64 -0.00 
Eastman Chemical 0.03 3.69 0.00 2.79 0.01 
Emerson Electric 0.02 2.60 0.00 3.19 0.01 
El Paso 0.04 4.22 0.00 1.23 0.00 
Eaton 0.03 3.77 -0.00 -0.47 -0.00 
Entergy 0.03 3.72 -0.00 -0.32 -0.00 
Exelon 0.02 3.11 -0.00 -0.07 -0.00 
Ford Motor 0.07 4.94 0.00 0.18 -0.00 
Fedex 0.03 3.77 0.00 0.24 -0.00 
FirstEnergy 0.03 3.57 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 
Fortune Brands 0.03 3.57 -0.00 -0.83 -0.00 
Gannett 0.04 3.43 -0.00 -0.91 -0.00 
General Dynamics 0.03 3.75 0.00 0.85 -0.00 
General Mills 0.02 3.29 -0.00 -1.97 0.00 
Corning 0.05 3.91 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Genworth Financial 0.04 4.22 -0.00 -0.08 -0.00 
Gap 0.04 4.44 -0.00 -0.91 -0.00 
Goodrich 0.03 3.39 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
Goldman Sachs Gp. 0.04 4.36 0.00 0.19 -0.00 
Goodyear Tire & Rub. 0.03 3.75 0.00 0.17 -0.00 
Halliburton 0.03 3.50 0.00 0.59 -0.00 
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Hasbro 0.04 2.87 -0.00 -0.92 -0.00 
Health Care Reit 0.01 1.42 0.00 0.21 -0.00 
Home Depot 0.04 3.83 0.00 0.78 -0.00 
Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp. 0.03 3.40 0.00 0.83 -0.00 
HJ Heinz 0.03 3.48 -0.00 -0.96 -0.00 
Honeywell Intl. 0.04 4.16 0.00 0.02 -0.00 
Starwood Htls.& Rsts. Worldwide 0.06 3.32 0.00 0.41 -0.00 
H&R Block 0.03 3.55 -0.00 -0.41 -0.00 
The Hershey Company 0.02 2.56 0.00 1.24 0.00 
Humana 0.01 2.18 0.00 2.54 0.00 
International Bus.Mchs. 0.03 3.46 0.00 0.10 -0.00 
Intl.Game Tech. 0.02 3.01 0.00 1.87 0.00 
Intl.Paper 0.04 4.08 -0.00 -0.12 -0.00 
Interpublic Gp. 0.05 4.21 -0.00 -0.76 -0.00 
Johnson Controls 0.04 3.54 -0.00 -0.31 -0.00 
Penney JC 0.03 3.33 0.00 1.11 0.00 
Johnson & Johnson 0.03 3.34 0.00 1.30 0.00 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 0.04 4.26 -0.00 -1.69 0.00 
Nordstrom 0.03 3.38 -0.00 -0.46 -0.00 
Kellogg 0.03 3.87 -0.00 -0.87 -0.00 
Kraft Foods 0.03 3.41 0.00 0.06 -0.00 
Kimco Realty 0.02 3.11 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 
Kimberly-Clark 0.03 3.58 0.00 0.13 -0.00 
Coca Cola 0.03 3.69 -0.00 -0.42 -0.00 
Kroger 0.02 3.34 -0.00 -0.82 -0.00 
Kohl's 0.03 2.98 -0.00 -1.03 0.00 
Lennar 'A' 0.06 5.42 -0.00 -1.36 0.00 
Eli Lilly 0.03 4.19 -0.00 -1.45 0.00 
Lockheed Martin 0.02 2.51 0.01 3.65 0.01 
Lincoln Nat. 0.03 4.05 0.00 1.05 0.00 
Southwest Airlines 0.06 4.93 -0.00 -0.30 -0.00 
Marriott Intl.'A' 0.04 4.06 0.00 2.04 0.00 
Masco 0.03 3.57 -0.00 -0.31 -0.00 
Mattel 0.03 4.08 -0.00 -0.25 -0.00 
McDonalds 0.02 3.13 0.00 2.41 0.00 
McKesson 0.02 3.19 0.00 0.97 -0.00 
Medtronic 0.04 3.97 -0.00 -1.12 0.00 
Massey En. 0.02 3.50 -0.00 -1.03 0.00 
Metlife 0.03 3.55 -0.00 -0.64 -0.00 
Medco Health Sltn. 0.03 3.63 0.00 0.34 -0.00 
Marsh & McLennan 0.03 3.39 -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 
3M 0.02 3.25 -0.00 -0.08 -0.00 
Altria Group 0.05 3.90 -0.00 -0.94 -0.00 
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Motorola 0.03 3.60 0.00 1.19 0.00 
Merck & Co. 0.04 4.13 -0.00 -0.59 -0.00 
Marathon Oil 0.02 2.59 0.01 3.62 0.01 
Meadwestvaco 0.07 3.67 -0.00 -0.53 -0.00 
Nabors Inds. 0.02 3.13 0.00 0.50 -0.00 
Newmont Mining 0.03 3.70 0.02 1.94 0.00 
Nike 'B' 0.02 2.11 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
Northrop Grumman 0.02 3.24 0.00 1.36 0.00 
Norfolk Southern 0.03 3.62 0.00 0.13 -0.00 
Northeast Utilities 0.02 0.78 -0.00 -0.47 -0.00 
Nucor 0.03 3.68 0.00 0.72 -0.00 
Newell Rubbermaid 0.03 4.00 -0.00 -0.72 -0.00 
Office Depot 0.03 3.52 0.00 0.53 -0.00 
Owens Illinois New 0.05 3.42 0.00 0.13 -0.00 
Oneok 0.04 3.83 -0.00 -0.25 -0.00 
Omnicom Gp. 0.03 3.79 -0.00 -0.81 -0.00 
Occidental Ptl. 0.03 3.39 0.00 1.24 0.00 
Pitney-Bowes 0.02 2.54 -0.00 -0.07 -0.00 
PepsiCo 0.03 3.33 0.00 0.41 -0.00 
Pfizer 0.04 4.33 -0.00 -0.95 -0.00 
Procter & Gamble 0.04 3.90 0.00 0.77 -0.00 
Pultegroup 0.04 4.45 -0.00 -1.22 0.00 
Prologis 0.02 2.75 -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 
Pepco Holdings 0.02 1.55 0.00 0.27 -0.00 
PPG Industries 0.03 3.46 0.00 0.88 -0.00 
Praxair 0.03 3.14 -0.00 -0.17 -0.00 
Qwest Comms.Intl. 0.03 2.26 -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 
Ryder System 0.03 3.29 0.00 1.19 0.00 
Republic Svs.'A' 0.03 3.19 -0.00 -2.05 0.01 
Radioshack 0.04 4.37 -0.00 -0.42 -0.00 
Raytheon 'B' 0.03 3.55 0.00 1.33 0.00 
Sealed Air 0.04 3.18 -0.00 -0.33 -0.00 
Sherwin-Williams 0.04 3.54 0.00 0.70 -0.00 
Sara Lee 0.02 3.38 -0.00 -0.46 -0.00 
SLM 0.06 3.63 -0.00 -0.89 -0.00 
Simon Pr.Gp. 0.04 4.06 -0.00 -0.30 -0.00 
Staples 0.03 3.93 -0.00 -0.08 -0.00 
Sempra En. 0.03 3.49 -0.00 -1.32 0.00 
Sunoco 0.03 3.57 0.00 0.34 -0.00 
Supervalu 0.04 3.74 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
Safeway 0.03 3.49 0.00 1.12 0.00 
AT&T 0.06 4.35 -0.00 -0.57 -0.00 
Teco Energy 0.10 3.84 0.00 0.04 -0.00 
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Target 0.04 4.03 -0.00 -0.53 -0.00 
Tenet Hlthcr. 0.04 4.28 -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 
TJX COS. 0.02 2.79 0.00 1.82 0.00 
Tyson Foods 'A' 0.03 3.46 0.00 0.26 -0.00 
Tesoro 0.05 3.37 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 
Time Warner 0.04 4.52 0.00 0.58 -0.00 
Textron 0.03 3.78 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
UnitedHealth Gp. 0.03 3.57 -0.00 -0.91 -0.00 
Unum Group 0.03 4.00 -0.00 -0.74 -0.00 
Union Pacific 0.04 3.72 0.00 0.43 -0.00 
United Parcel Ser. 0.05 4.52 -0.00 -1.03 0.00 
United Technologies 0.03 3.71 -0.00 -0.50 -0.00 
V F 0.02 2.29 -0.00 -0.17 -0.00 
Valero Energy 0.03 3.38 0.01 1.19 0.00 
Vornado Realty Tst. 0.02 2.50 0.00 2.97 0.01 
Wisconsin Energy 0.01 0.47 0.00 1.24 0.00 
Wells Fargo & Co 0.03 3.45 0.00 0.27 -0.00 
Whirlpool 0.04 4.12 0.00 0.83 -0.00 
Wellpoint 0.02 3.28 0.00 0.59 -0.00 
Williams Cos. 0.04 4.00 0.00 0.60 -0.00 
Wal Mart Stores 0.03 3.29 0.01 3.72 0.01 
Weyerhaeuser 0.04 4.47 -0.00 -1.96 0.00 
US.Steel 0.02 2.98 0.00 0.29 -0.00 
Xcel Energy 0.03 3.02 0.00 0.04 -0.00 
Xl Cap.'A' 0.04 3.74 -0.00 -0.75 -0.00 
Exxon Mobil 0.04 4.22 -0.00 -0.40 -0.00 
Xerox 0.10 3.57 -0.00 -0.65 -0.00 
XTO En. 0.03 3.85 -0.00 -0.32 -0.00 
Yum! Brands 0.03 3.58 0.00 1.83 0.00 
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Chapter 4. Market Quality and the Financial Crisis 
4.1. Introduction 
 “Bond and derivative traders, who tend to focus on balance-sheet risks and ignore management 
happy talk, were way ahead of stock investors in picking up on problems in the subprime 
mortgage market and elsewhere. And they remain more bearish.”9 
        Business Week, March 2008 
The above quote from Business Week is a comment on the quality of the CDS market with 
regards to assimilating information into prices.  Taken in the backdrop of the subprime crisis, it 
suggests that the CDS market has displayed a higher level of efficiency than other markets in 
recognizing risk and incorporating it into spreads.   
CDS and stocks present the chance to study two different markets for the same underlying asset 
but with different price discovery dynamics.   While the stock market has a relatively large 
number of retail investors, the less liquid CDS market consists primarily of banks, hedge funds 
and other financial institutions that may be considered relatively well informed especially when 
compared to investors in the stock market.  Due to this possible information asymmetry between 
the two markets, we expect to see differences in the price discovery process between the two.   
Although a number of research papers have looked at the CDS market price discovery and a few 
at CDS market misreaction, most of them use data prior to 2007 and thus do not provide any 
insights into how the market may have changed since the sub-prime crisis.  We believe that there 
is reason to test the market for changes since the crisis due to the following reasons: 
                                                 
9
 “Bonds are saying nasty things about stocks”, Coy, Peter; March 17, 2008, Business Week. 
New York: Issue 4075; pg. 70 
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1) Given the low default probabilities in the pre-subprime world, hedge funds were active 
players in the CDS market, providing insurance cover to investors in return for a quarterly 
premium.  However, as the general risk levels have increased and these funds have been 
driven out of the market, we expect the CDS market focus to shift from income generation to 
pricing of risk based on credit events.   
2) At the same time, we are cognizant of the fact that with the financial crisis and issues at some 
large CDS trading financial institutions, liquidity and growth in the CDS market has suffered 
significantly and the market is still going through a slow period.  This would seem to suggest 
a weakening of efficiency in the CDS market. 
 
While the first reason may suggest that CDS markets have become more efficient, the second 
factor points to drying up of liquidity in this market, thereby reducing informational efficiency.  
Given demands to introduce more regulations in this OTC market, we are interested in testing for 
any changes that may have occurred in this market from a price efficiency perspective.   
Our contribution to literature is along two dimensions.  We analyze the CDS market price 
discovery vis-à-vis the stock market as well as look for possible evidence of over-reaction or 
under-reaction by CDS investors.  Further, splitting the time frame for our study into pre and 
post crisis allows us to identify any changes that may have taken place in the CDS market due to 
the global financial sector meltdown. 
Using a Granger causality lead-lag test on the stock and CDS markets, we find that the stock 
market remains the main market for price discovery both before and after the crisis even in the 
case of the higher risk firms.  Examining share trading volume, CDS liquidity proxy and analyst 
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coverage, we conclude that an increased share trade volume is the most likely reason for the 
increase in price discovery in the stock market.   
As a test of the CDS market quality, we use Variance Ratios to analyze how well the CDS 
market is able to incorporate information into spreads.  Using the variance in spread changes, we 
compare the long term variance to a time-scaled short term variance with a ratio close to 1 
reflecting the market’s ability to price information accurately.  Our results are quite interesting as 
they show the CDS market over-reacting to information in the pre-crisis period and then under-
reacting in the post-crisis scenario.  We look at possible factors like industry concentration and 
risk levels but do not find any conclusive relationship.  Further, contrary to existing literature 
where lower liquidity translates to over-reaction, we find lower liquidity in the CDS market 
accompanied by under-reaction.   
Note that we use the terms “pre-crisis” and “post-crisis” in this study to define two distinct 
periods in our dataset i.e. Jan 2005 – Jun 2007 (pre-crisis) and Jul 2007 – Oct 2009 (post-crisis).  
It can be argued that the global financial crisis is still ongoing and we recognize that the latter 
term may suggest otherwise.  However, we wish to highlight that the term “post-crisis” is simply 
used to define a period where the CDS market has gone through a transformation with generally 
higher risk and lower liquidity levels and does not suggest an end to the financial crisis. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the literature 
survey and our key test hypotheses while Section 4.3 looks at the data set.  Section 4.4 talks 
about the price discovery test while Section 4.5 covers the variance ratio test for misreaction. 
The conclusion follows in Section 4.6.   
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4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1 Price Discovery 
Longstaff et al. (2005) examine the stock, bond and CDS markets to conclude that while both 
CDS and stocks lead the bond market, no clear results emerge when the CDS and stock markets 
are compared.  Norden and Weber (2007) find that bonds and CDS have little impact on stocks 
in terms of price discovery. 
Blanco et al. (2005) examine the CDS and bond markets to conclude that there is greater price 
discovery in the CDS markets than in the bond markets.  Forte and Pena (2009) find the stock 
market leading CDS and both CDS and shares leading the bond market.  Therefore, while it is 
generally accepted that the bond market lags CDS and stocks, it is unclear how the CDS would 
perform against the stock market given mixed results.   
Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) look at the CDS and stock 
markets to find that CDS spreads contain information ahead of the stock markets in case of 
adverse news.  Acharya and Johnson find evidence of insider trading in the CDS markets which 
results in the CDS leading the stock market.  
Forte and Lovreta (2008) look at the stock and CDS markets for the period 2002-2004 to find 
that CDS spreads lead the price discovery process for the higher risk (lower rating) credits 
thereby supporting the Acharya and Johnson findings.  More importantly, they find evidence 
suggesting the informational dominance of the stock market declining over the period 2002-
2004. 
Norden and Weber (2010) examine the informational content of CDS for subordinated and 
senior debt of 20 financial institutions from seven countries.  They find that while CDS on both 
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subordinated and senior bank debt contribute to price discovery in the pre-crisis scenario, 
subordinated debt CDS offer an advantage in terms of lower transaction costs.  However, they 
find that in the post-crisis scenario, the senior debt CDS reflects information first and the 
transaction cost benefit of subordinated debt also disappears. 
Given the mixed results when comparing the CDS and stock markets as well as the evidence of 
market dynamics changing over time, we update the literature by extending this analysis to the 
post crisis scenario.  To the best of our knowledge, the Norden and Weber (2010) working paper 
is the only research paper that looks at CDS informational efficiency in a pre and post scenario.  
However, their focus is on differences in price discovery between senior and subordinated debt 
while we are looking at identifying any changes in informational efficiency that may have taken 
place in the CDS and stock market as a result of the sub-prime crisis.  Our contribution to 
literature is therefore twofold.  Given mixed results from previous studies, our paper updates the 
literature to include the recent financial crisis as well as increase the study sample size to almost 
199 firms as previous papers were all limited to a much smaller sample size. 
4.2.2 Market Misreaction 
Other than the papers looking at stock market returns (DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Daniel et al. 
(1998)) and equity derivative prices (Stein (1989), Poteshman (2001)), there are relatively few 
studies examining the CDS markets from the perspective of market misreaction.  In our search, 
we only found 3 papers on market misreaction that looked at the CDS market spreads. 
Norden and Weber (2004) and Hull et al. (2004) both look at rating events to conclude that that 
the markets are informationally efficient with CDS adjusting in advance of credit downgrades.  
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Greatrex (2008), using data upto 2006, looks at earnings announcements to find evidence of 
over-reaction to negative news and under-reaction to positive earnings announcements.   
Our focus in this paper is slightly different in that we do not conduct an event time study but 
instead, look at the entire dataset using variance ratio.  This measure of long term variance to 
short term variance was introduced by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) as a random walk test and 
adapted by many including Bessembinder (2003) and Kaul and Sapp (2009) as a test of market 
quality.  Using this measure allows us to study a large sample of firms over a long period of time 
which is something that has been absent from CDS market literature. 
4.2.3 Key Hypotheses 
The underlying premise in our paper is that there has been a shift in CDS market dynamics since 
June 2007 and we expect to see the CDS markets lead the price discovery process across all risk 
levels (contrary to the Acharya and Johnson findings).  We therefore test the following 
hypotheses in the two markets from Jan 2005 – Jun 2007 (pre-crisis) and from Jul 2007 – Oct 
2009 (post-crisis): 
Our first hypothesis tests our data to ensure that it supports findings from previous studies. 
H1: Stocks lead the price discovery process in the first sub-period. 
Given the change in market dynamics due to the financial sector crisis, there is a greater focus on 
risk management.  We therefore expect to see the CDS market reacting ahead of stocks in the 
price discovery process and more importantly, we do not expect to see this lead to be confined to 
higher credit risks as has been seen in previous studies (Forte and Lovreta (2008)). 
H2: CDS spreads lead the price discovery process in the second sub-period. 
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With the VIX reaching a historical peak of 80.86 on 20 November 2008, we have seen the 
financial markets experience extremely high volatility levels.  Given that Greatrex (2008) finds 
the CDS market over-reacting to bad news, we expect to find evidence of a general market over-
reaction as the post-crisis period has been characterized by a period of significantly higher 
market risk levels.  
H3: The CDS market reflects over-reaction in the post-crisis period. 
4.3. Data  
We use daily and weekly stock and CDS data for 198 US firms available through DataStream for 
the period Jan 2005 – Oct 2009.  While our initial database for CDS consisted of 242 firms, we 
removed firms that are missing data or have suspect data.  While CDS are available for terms 
from 1 to 10 years, we use CDS spreads with a 5-year term for underlying senior, unsecured 
corporate debt as this represents the tenor with the highest liquidity levels.  
A snapshot of the average CDS spreads for all firms for both periods is given in Table 4.1 
reflecting an increase in the general risk level in the overall market.  While the highest risk firm 
in the pre-crisis period only attracts an average premium of 636 bppa, the maximum average 
CDS spread has jumped up to 2,655 bppa since the start of the financial market meltdown.  A 
comparison of the mean of the average CDS spreads for all firms in both periods reflects an 
increase of over 3.7 times.    
Using the firm SIC codes, we assign the firms into 8 industry classifications (Table 4.2) and find 
that Mining, Services and Financial sectors reflect the highest levels of average CDS spreads in 
the post-crisis period.  Interestingly, we find that the wholesale trade sector experienced a decline 
in CDS spreads.   
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The main take away from the two tables is that there has been a general marked increase in risk 
levels from the pre-crisis to post-crisis period.  Given that previous research has found that CDS 
market quality is different for high risk firms than it is for low risk firms, we expect to see a 
general shift in the CDS market dynamics as almost all firms have experienced higher risk levels. 
4.4. Price Discovery Test 
4.4.1 Methodology   
We start with an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check both sub-periods for stationarity.  We 
find evidence of unit-roots in all cases and therefore use the first difference.  Having a stationary 
data series, we conduct a Granger-causality test using a VAR model on daily as well as weekly 
data.   For the daily data, we use 5 period lags to ensure that the entire week is taken into account 
while we use 4 period lags in our weekly data to capture the entire month.  The following tests 
are conducted for both sub-periods on daily and weekly data: 
CDSi,t   =  + 2CDSi,(t-1 to t-n) + 3Share Returni,(t-1 to t-n) + 1,t 
Share Returni,t  =  + 2CDSi,(t-1 to t-n) + 3Share Returni,(t-1 to t-n) + 2,t 
Where,  
CDSi,t   = Change in CDS Spread for firm i at time t; 
Share Returni,t  = Log share price return for firm i at time t; 
n   = lag value where n=5 for daily data and n=4 for monthly data;
,     = Regression coefficients; 
    = Stochastic error terms 
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Previous literature shows that CDS markets lead the price discovery process for higher risk 
firms.  We therefore split our sample into 3 groups of 66 firms each, representing low, medium 
and high risk firms.  To assign a firm to a group, we use the firm's average CDS spread for the 
period and mark it as a low, medium or high risk credit based on the criteria in Table 4.3.   
An issue with this classification method is that a firm with relatively stable CDS spreads could 
appear to move from a high risk level to a lower one given the increase in the relative 
classification bracket e.g. a firm with a spread level of 30 bppa in both periods would move from 
medium risk to a low risk group simply due to the definition of the groups while the true risk 
level for the firm has remained unchanged. 
To account for such cases, we also classify firms on the basis of the level of increase in the 
average CDS spreads between the two periods.  Therefore, in the above example, the firm with a 
stable CDS spread would remain in the low risk group as defined in Table 4.4. 
4.4.1 Results  
We conduct causality tests on daily and weekly data to understand where price discovery occurs.  
The following analysis provides a summary of our findings.  
Pre-crisis 
In line with findings from previous studies, we find stocks leading the price discovery process in 
63 cases while CDS leading in only 14 instances in the pre-crisis period (Table 4.5).   
The Risk Group classification shows that in 7 (50%) of the cases where CDS leads the price 
discovery process, the firm is placed in the high risk group which confirms findings from prior 
studies.  Our results for stock market leading price discovery are more interesting as we find that 
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27 cases (out of 63) represent firms in the high risk group where CDS would be expected to lead.  
The evidence therefore supports H1 that the stock market leads the price discovery process in the 
pre-crisis period. 
We also consider the results on a weekly basis (Table 4.6) where we find 14 instances of CDS 
leading and 45 cases of stocks leading price discovery.  For stocks, weekly data reflects fewer 
occurrences as compared to daily data.  This can be explained as markets are efficient and 
therefore market news in most cases would be priced in during the first 5 trading days and thus 
not reflected in weekly data.  Looking at the cases where price discovery occurs, our results are 
similar to what we find using daily data.  
Post-crisis 
Based on the premise that the crisis has led to a change in the CDS market with a higher level of 
price discovery in the CDS market, we expect to find the CDS leading the stock market.  Our 
results (Table 4.7) show 24 cases where CDS leads price discovery and 144 cases of stocks 
leading.  While we find an increased level of price discovery in the CDS market from the pre-
crisis scenario, our findings are still overwhelmingly in favour of the stock market leading the 
process. 
Looking at the cases where CDS leads the stock market, we again find only 50% of cases are 
high risk.  Furthermore, we find 3 companies carrying through from our pre-crisis list while the 
remaining 21 in this category are new.   
Examining the 12 firms in the high risk group, we find that in 11 cases where the firms have 
previously been lower risk and have recently moved into the higher risk group (i.e. have CDS 
spreads that have increased by more than 4.5 times what they were before the crisis).  This tells 
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us that firms that may have previously been ignored by CDS traders due to low risk levels are 
now receiving more focus and have therefore greater information content than their respective 
shares in the stock market.  
Looking at the cases where the stock market leads CDS, we find that the largest group comprises 
of high risk firms, which is contrary to our expected results.  Looking at the movement in spread 
levels for these firms, we find that stocks lead in cases that reflect some of the largest relative 
credit spread increases.   
Using weekly data (Table 4.8), we again find fewer instances of price discovery occurring in the 
two markets compared to using daily data; 10 for CDS leading stocks and 32 for stocks leading 
CDS.  We find that in most cases when CDS leads the stock market, the firm is mid-risk rather 
than high risk which is a result that is difficult to explain.   
Our post-crisis results from the Granger causality test fail to support our H2 as we find the stock 
market still leading the price discovery process with this relationship holding across risk levels. 
4.4.3 Further Analysis 
Our results from the price discovery tests can be explained by one of two possible reasons. 
Informational efficiency could be driven either by the higher liquidity levels in the stock market 
or by the more savvy investors/traders in the CDS market.  As the idea of this paper is to identify 
any changes in the CDS and stock market price discovery mechanism due to the financial sector 
meltdown, we focus on the post-crisis scenario results in our analysis. 
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Our general finding is that, since the start of the crisis, stocks have started contributing even 
more to the price discovery process.  We therefore try to isolate some key factors that could 
impact informational efficiency in the two markets: 
1) CDS Liquidity:  With a higher level of liquidity, we would expect to see faster dissemination 
of information in this market.  Given that the CDS instruments are traded over-the-market, there 
is little information available on their actual trading volumes.  We use the Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) measure represented by the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity.   
The average bid-ask spread for our data increases from 5.35 bps in the pre-crisis period to 13.75 
bps in the post-crisis period reflecting a decrease in liquidity in the overall CDS market - except 
for one firm where the bid-ask spread remains almost unchanged, we find a widening of spreads 
in all cases.   
In a recent working paper, Dragon and Yan (2007) proxy CDS liquidity by a scaled measure as 
well i.e. the percentage spread (bid-ask spread divided by the mid spread).  Using this we find 
that the scaled bid-ask spread decreases from 16.3% to 9.3% in the post-crisis period showing an 
increased liquidity situation in the post-crisis world.   
To understand this contradiction between the two measures, we must consider actual CDS spread 
levels (i.e. the scaling factor) and find that while the average bid-ask spreads have increased, the 
increase in average CDS spreads has been from 52bps to 194 bps.  This more than proportional 
increase in CDS spread levels results in a reduction in scaled bid-ask spread levels.    
Given that the CDS market liquidity decreased during the crisis, especially given the AIG issues, 
the bid-ask spread measure makes more sense as a liquidity proxy and we use it in our paper.  
This measure shows that the average CDS liquidity decreased in the post-crisis period. 
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2) Stock Volume Traded:  In line with our focus on liquidity, we also look at the average level of 
trading activity in the stock market.   An increase in the average trade volume in the post-crisis 
period may be able to explain the increased level of price efficiency in the stock markets.  Our 
data shows that the average daily stock trading volume increased from around 485,000 shares in 
the pre-crisis period to 1.05 million shares in the post-crisis world with 143 firms registering an 
increase and 55 companies showing a decline in traded volume.  As a result, we can conclude 
that, unlike in the CDS market, liquidity in the stock market has increased during the post-crisis 
period. 
2) Analyst estimates: As an additional measure, we consider analyst coverage of the firms in our 
database.  Research firms assign analysts to a firm depending on the level of public interest or 
investment potential in that company.  Therefore an increase in the number of analysts covering 
a firm can be used as a proxy for heightened investor awareness about or interest in a firm and 
would lead to faster absorption of firm related news. 
Given the higher level of trading volume in the post-crisis period, we expect to see an increase in 
the number of analysts covering these firms.  However, we find that the average number of 
analysts covering the firms decreases from 14.6 in the pre-crisis scenario to 13.6 in the post-
crisis world with only 62 of the 198 firms showing an increase in analyst coverage (we could not 
find analyst coverage data for 3 firms).  The declining analyst coverage should be seen in the 
backdrop of the financial crisis where significant layoffs occurred in financial institutions, 
including equity research units. 
We therefore use these three measures of liquidity and information coverage to understand the 
change in price discovery dynamics since the start of the financial crisis.   
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Looking at the firms where the CDS market leads, we find a widening of bid-ask spreads from 6 
bps to 27 bps in all cases (Table 4.9) reflecting lower CDS liquidity for these firms. We also find 
a decrease in analyst coverage in 16 of the 24 cases while traded share volumes increase in 16 
cases.    
Focusing on the 144 cases where the stock markets lead the CDS market, we find that average 
bid-ask spreads increase from 6 bps to 15 bps; an increase in almost all cases.  We also find an 
increase in the traded share volumes and a small decline in analyst coverage.   
We now consider the CDS or risk levels as an alternative explanation for our price discovery 
results.  We find that CDS levels (Table 4.7) for firms where the CDS market leads, have 
increased from an average of 89 bps to 411 bps while firms where price leads have also 
increased but only increased from 59 bps to 211 bps.    
The above shows that the stock market liquidity is primarily driving price discovery while only 
in instances where risk levels are very high, price discovery occurs in the CDS markets.  This is 
in line with findings from previous studies and our paper finds that despite the upheaval in the 
financial sector, price discovery dynamics have remained unchanged. 
4.5. Variance Ratio Test 
4.5.1 Methodology 
Taking the random walk test measure developed by Lo and MacKinlay (1998) and used by 
Bessembinder (2003) and Kaul and Sapp (2009), we compute the Variance Ratio for each firm 
(i) as follows: 
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Since variance is linear in time, we adjust the variance of daily spread changes by a factor of 5 to 
make it comparable to the weekly spread change variance.  If CDS spreads follow a random 
walk, all spread movements will be permanent and we would see a ratio close or equal to 1.  
However, a ratio that is systematically less than or greater than 1 would imply that the spread 
movements are following a correction pattern as the market is mis-reacting.   
If the market systematically over-reacts (under-reacts) to information, we are likely to see higher 
(lower) volatility in short term spread movements than in the long term.  As a result, over-
reaction (under-reaction) would lead to a variance ratio that is significant and less (greater) than 
1.0 and a ratio close to 1.0 reflects high market quality. Once the ratios are computed for the pre 
and post periods, we use the Z-statistic to check if the ratio is significantly different from 1.0.   
4.5.2 Results 
Looking at the pre-crisis period, we find the variance ratio to be significantly less than 1.0 for 
147 firms showing the CDS market systematically over-reacting to information.  In 34 cases, this 
ratio is above 1 i.e. under-reaction, while the ratio is indistinguishable from 1 in only 17 
instances.  Therefore, the results (Table 4.10) for the pre-crisis period point to a systematic over-
reaction in the CDS market. 
Looking at the results for the same firm in the post-crisis period, we find the situation completely 
reversed (Table 4.11).  There is over-reaction in only 27 cases while there is evidence of under-
reaction in 162 firms.  We are therefore unable to support our H3 that the CDS market 
systematically over-reacts to information since the crisis.   
We are comparing daily variance against weekly variance and it is possible that we need to 
consider a longer time frame.   Therefore, we also run the same test on daily to monthly data but 
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our key results remain unchanged i.e. the market has moved from over-reacting before the crisis 
to under-reacting since the crisis. 
We look at firm risk level as well as industry classification to check if this shift can be ascribed 
to any particular industry or risk group.  If that is the case, we would investigate further to see if 
any unique changes occurred in those groups during the crisis but do not see any common theme 
emerge.  As a result, this shift from over-reaction to under-reaction is a general industry trend 
and must explained by factors common the entire CDS market. 
We next turn to liquidity to look for a possible explanation as Cox and Peterson (1994) and 
Larson and Madura (2001) both show that lower liquidity results in over-reaction in stocks and 
currencies.   We have already seen evidence of a reduction in liquidity in the CDS market with 
the start of the financial crisis suggesting markets should over-react.  Therefore our finding that 
the market is under-reacting is contrary to expectations and should be investigated further.  
4.6. Conclusion  
This paper looks at the CDS market quality both, before and since the financial crisis.  We test 
for any changes to the price discovery dynamics and for evidence of any over or under reaction 
in the CDS market.  Compared to existing literature in this area, the study allows us to expand 
the sample size to almost 200 firms as well as update findings to include the period since the 
financial crisis began in 2007.   Our findings also have implications on policy decisions 
regarding CDS given discussion about taking the market from an OTC structure to an exchanged 
based environment. 
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Looking at daily and weekly data for CDS and stock prices for before and after the crisis, we get 
mixed results showing that while stock markets lead CDS in more cases, there is no real change 
in how the two markets have behaved before and since the crisis.  Our results show that despite 
the financial crisis and the subsequent focus on credit, players in the CDS markets are still not 
capturing credit events ahead of the stock market. 
 Our results regarding possible market mis-reaction are much more interesting as we find the 
CDS market has shifted from an overall over-reaction before the crisis to under-reaction since 
the start of the crisis.  This is especially puzzling as existing literature finds a tightening of 
liquidity usually associated with over-reaction which is contrary to our findings.  This implies 
that there are other factors that may have to be considered and provides the opportunity for 
further investigation. 
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Table 4.1 
CDS Spread Snapshot - Pre-crisis and Post-crisis 
(bppa) Overall Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Average  116 52 194 
Median  70 31 110 
 Min  19 6 29 
 Max  1,542 636 2,655 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Sectoral CDS Spreads 
Sector/Spread (bppa) Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Mining  102 239 
 Construction  81 184 
 Manufacturing  111 148 
 Transportation & Utilities  97 145 
 Wholesale Trade  115 75 
 Retail   73 154 
 Finance Insurance Real Estate  89 220 
 Services  88 233 
 
 
Table 4.3 
Firm Classification Basis - I  
bppa  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Group 1 0 - 23 0 - 71 
Group 2 23 - 41 71 - 169 
Group 3 41 - 636 169 - 2,655 
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  Table 4.4 
Firm Classification Basis - II 
 
Change from pre to post crisis average spreads 
Group 1 Upto 2.4x 
Group 2 2.4x - 4.5x 
Group 3 4.5x - 34.3x 
 
 
Table 4.5 
Pre-crisis Results (Daily) 
CDS Leads Stock (Daily) 
Count Risk group 
 
(bppa) Pre Post 
Low 3 
 
Average 78 335 
Mid 4 
 
Min 13 52 
High 7 
 
Max 387 1,020 
Stock Leads CDS (Daily) 
Count Risk group 
 
(bppa) Pre Post 
Low 17 
 
Average 80 278 
Mid 19 
 
Min 7 40 
High 27 
 
Max 636 2,655 
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Table 4.6 
Pre-crisis Results (Weekly) 
CDS Leads Stock (Weekly) 
Count Risk group 
 
(bppa) Pre Post 
Low 5 
 
Average 57  173  
Mid 2 
 
Min 7  46  
High 7 
 
Max 249  775  
Stock Leads CDS (Weekly) 
Count Risk group 
 
(bppa) Pre Post 
Low 7  
 
Average 51  192  
Mid 18  
 
Min 17  43  
High 20  
 
Max 330  651  
 
 
 
Table 4.7 
Post-crisis Results (Daily) 
CDS Leads Stock (Daily) 
Count Risk group Group change (bppa) Pre Post 
Low 4 8 Average 89  411  
Mid 8 5 Min 17  40  
High 12 11 Max 636  2,655  
Stock Leads CDS (Daily) 
Count Risk group Group change (bppa) Pre Post 
Low 39 38 Average 59  222  
Mid 51 53 Min 6  31  
High 54 53 Max 636  2,655  
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Table 4.8 
Post-crisis Results (Weekly) 
CDS Leads Stock (Weekly) 
Count Risk group Group change (bppa) Pre Post 
Low 1  1  Average 33  211  
Mid 6  3  Min 6  36  
High 3  6  Max 81  961  
Stock Leads CDS (Weekly) 
Count Risk group Group change (bppa) Pre Post 
Low 5  11  Average 98  362  
Mid 13  13  Min 14  43  
High 14  8  Max 636  2,655  
 
 
Table 4.9 
Post-crisis Factor Analysis 
CDS Leads Price (Daily) 
Average Pre-crisis Post-crisis Increase cases Decrease cases 
 
Bid-Ask Spread (bps) 
 
6 27 - 24 
Share Volume Traded 400,665 1,216,544 16 8 
 
Analyst coverage 
 
15.9 16 7 16 
Price Leads CDS (Daily) 
Average Pre-crisis Post-crisis Increase cases Decrease cases 
 
Bid-Ask Spread (bps) 6 15 143 1 
 
Share Volume Traded 458,984 1,158,689 107 37 
 
Analyst coverage 
 
14.5 
 
13.8 
 
46 
 
97 
 
 
Table 4.10 
Variance Ratio Summary Result 
 
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Variance Ratio 0.79 1.25 
# of firms - under-reaction 34 162 
# of firms - over-reaction 147 27 
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Table 4.11 
Results of Mis-reaction 
Firm_id Firm_Name Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
1 Alcoa Over Under 
2 Amerisourcebergen Over - 
3 Abbott Laboratories Over Under 
4 Archer-Danls.-Midl. Over Under 
5 Amer.Elec.Pwr. Under Under 
6 AES Over Under 
7 Aetna Over Under 
8 Allergan Over Over 
9 American Intl.Gp. Over Under 
10 AK Steel Hldg. - Under 
11 Allstate Over Under 
12 Advanced Micro Devc. Under Over 
13 Amgen Over Under 
14 American Tower 'A' Over Over 
15 Apache Over Under 
16 Anadarko Petroleum Over Under 
17 Avalonbay Commns. Over Under 
18 Avon Products Over Over 
19 American Express Over Under 
20 Allegheny En. Over Under 
21 Autozone Under Under 
22 Bank Of America Over Under 
23 Baxter Intl. Over Over 
24 Baker Hughes Over Under 
25 Ball Over Over 
26 Bristol Myers Squibb Over Under 
27 Boston Scientific Over Under 
28 Peabody Energy Over Under 
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29 Boston Properties Over Under 
30 Citigroup Over Under 
31 CA Under Under 
32 Cardinal Health - Under 
33 Caterpillar Over Under 
34 Chubb Over Under 
35 Carnival Over Under 
36 Chesapeake Energy - Under 
37 Cigna Over Under 
38 Colgate-Palm. Over Over 
39 Clorox Over Under 
40 Comcast 'A' Under Under 
41 Cummins Over Under 
42 CMS Energy Under Under 
43 Centerpoint En. Over Over 
44 Costco Wholesale Over Over 
45 Campbell Soup Over Over 
46 Computer Scis. - Under 
47 CSX Over Under 
48 Chevron Over Over 
49 Dominion Res. Under Under 
50 E I Du Pont De Nemours Over Under 
51 Deere Over Under 
52 Dell Over Under 
53 Dean Foods New Over Under 
54 D R Horton Under Under 
55 Danaher Over Under 
56 Walt Disney Over Under 
57 Dover Over Under 
58 Dow Chemical Over Under 
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59 Darden Restaurants Over Under 
60 Duke Energy Over Under 
61 Devon Energy Under Under 
62 Conoco Phillips Over Under 
63 Eastman Kodak Over Under 
64 Eastman Chemical - Under 
65 Emerson Electric Over Under 
66 El Paso Under Under 
67 Eaton Over - 
68 Entergy Over Under 
69 Exelon Under Under 
70 Ford Motor Under - 
71 Fedex Over Under 
72 FirstEnergy Under Under 
73 Fortune Brands Over Under 
74 Gannett Over Under 
75 General Dynamics Over Under 
76 General Mills Over Under 
77 Corning Over Under 
78 Genworth Financial - Under 
79 Gap Under Under 
80 Goodrich - Under 
81 Goldman Sachs Gp. - Under 
82 Goodyear Tire & Rub. Under Under 
83 Halliburton Over Under 
84 Hasbro Over Under 
85 Health Care Reit Over Over 
86 Home Depot Over Under 
87 Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp. Over Under 
88 HJ Heinz Over Under 
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89 Honeywell Intl. Over Under 
90 Starwood Htls.& Rsts. Worldwide Over Under 
91 H&R Block - Under 
92 The Hershey Company Over Over 
93 Humana Over Over 
94 International Bus.Mchs. Over Under 
95 Intl.Game Tech. Over Under 
96 Intl.Paper Under Under 
97 Interpublic Gp. Under Under 
98 Johnson Controls Over Under 
99 Penney JC Under Under 
100 Johnson & Johnson Over Under 
101 JP Morgan Chase & Co. Over Under 
102 Nordstrom Over Under 
103 Kellogg Over Over 
104 Kraft Foods Over Under 
105 Kimco Realty Over Under 
106 Kimberly-Clark Over Under 
107 Coca Cola Over Over 
108 Kroger - Under 
109 Kohl's Over Under 
110 Lennar 'A' Under Under 
111 Eli Lilly Over Over 
112 Lockheed Martin Over Under 
113 Lincoln Nat. Over Under 
114 Southwest Airlines Over Under 
115 Marriott Intl.'A' Over Under 
116 Masco Over Under 
117 Mattel Over - 
118 McDonalds Over Under 
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119 McKesson Under Under 
120 Medtronic Over Under 
121 Massey En. Over Under 
122 Metlife Over Under 
123 Medco Health Sltn. Over Over 
124 Marsh & McLennan - Over 
125 3M Over Over 
126 Altria Group - Under 
127 Motorola Over Under 
128 Merck & Co. Over - 
129 Marathon Oil Over Under 
130 Meadwestvaco Under Under 
131 Nabors Inds. Over Under 
132 Newmont Mining Over Under 
133 Nike 'B' - - 
134 Northrop Grumman Over Under 
135 Norfolk Southern Over Under 
136 Northeast Utilities Over Under 
137 Nucor Over Under 
138 Newell Rubbermaid Over Under 
139 Office Depot Over Under 
140 Owens Illinois New Over Under 
141 Oneok Over Under 
142 Omnicom Gp. Over Under 
143 Occidental Ptl. Over Under 
144 Pitney-Bowes Over Under 
145 PepsiCo Over Over 
146 Pfizer Over - 
147 Procter & Gamble Over Under 
148 Pultegroup Under Under 
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149 Prologis Over Under 
150 Pepco Holdings Over Under 
151 PPG Industries Over Under 
152 Praxair Over Under 
153 Qwest Comms.Intl. Over - 
154 Ryder System Over Under 
155 Republic Svs.'A' Over Over 
156 Radioshack Under Under 
157 Raytheon 'B' Over Under 
158 Sealed Air Over Under 
159 Sherwin-Williams - Under 
160 Sara Lee Under Under 
161 SLM Under Under 
162 Simon Pr.Gp. Over Under 
163 Staples Over Under 
164 Sempra En. - Under 
165 Sunoco Over Under 
166 Supervalu Over Under 
167 Safeway Over Under 
168 AT&T Over Over 
169 Teco Energy Over - 
170 Target Over Under 
171 Tenet Hlthcr. Under Under 
172 TJX Cos. Over Under 
173 Tyson Foods 'A' Under Under 
174 Tesoro Over Under 
175 Time Warner Under Under 
176 Textron Over Under 
177 United Health Gp. Over Under 
178 Unum Group Under Under 
122 
179 Union Pacific - Under 
180 United Parcel Ser. Over Under 
181 United Technologies Over Under 
182 V F Over Under 
183 Valero Energy Under Under 
184 Vornado Realty Tst. Over Under 
185 Wisconsin Energy Over Over 
186 Wells Fargo & Co Over Under 
187 Whirlpool - Under 
188 Wellpoint Over Over 
189 Williams Cos. Under Under 
190 Wal Mart Stores Over Under 
191 Weyerhaeuser Under Under 
192 US.Steel Under Under 
193 Xcel Energy Over Over 
194 Xl Cap.'A' Over Under 
195 Exxon Mobil Over Over 
196 Xerox Under Under 
197 XTO En. Over Under 
198 Yum! Brands Over Under 
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